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”History has taught us: never underestimate the amount
of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart
a security system. It’s always better to assume the worst.
Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume
science and technology will soon be able to do things they
cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself
more security than you need today. When the unexpected
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A Quantum Key Distribution system has been demonstrated with a focus on appli-
cability of the technology to a consumer use model. The optical devices were split
into a large, expensive “Quantum ATM” (the Bob terminal) and a small, cheap
handheld section (the Alice device).
Work was initially done to integrate the devices into a realistic demonstration
system which was exhibited at several international conferences. Following this
success, the devices constituent parts were isolated and improved upon. Work on
the Alice device focused upon proposing a new scheme for light collimation and then
investigating a method to enact this. In the Bob device the progress was directed
towards a more effective single photon detection system utilizing active quenching.
An asymptotic secure key rate of 20kb/s was obtained at a bit error rate (BER)
of 4% corresponding to a daylight operation scenario. A docking scheme was enacted
to simplify the alignment of the optical channel which was shown to be repeatable
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Most modern cryptography relies on the complexity of various mathematical opera-
tions to ensure security [1]. Presently this is an acceptable situation however recent
advances in the field of quantum information have uncovered that were a quan-
tum computer constructed, there are efficient algorithms [2] to solve the complex
equations required to crack the current cryptosystems.
It is fortunate, however, that other advances in quantum information have pro-
vided an alternate scheme for cryptography, in which unconditional security is en-
sured by the laws of physics. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the process by
which a random bit string (key) is established between two parties, hereby known as
“Alice” and “Bob”, secure in the knowledge that this sharing cannot be intercepted
by an eavesdropper, hereby known as “Eve”.
There has been work on “post-quantum” cryptography which consists of cryp-
tography based on problems whose solutions do not benefit from a speed increase
on a quantum computer however since classical systems have been beaten once, it is





1 It must be small and light; comparable to current consumer cryp-
tographic devices.
2 It must be low cost such that, for example, it could be distributed,
for free, to customers of a bank.
3 Key agreement between the user and central terminal must be sim-
ple to initiate and quick to conclude.
4 These criteria must not compromise the unconditional security of-
fered by QKD.
Table 1.1: The criteria for the design brief for our QKD system.
system implemented that is currently assumed to be secure.
In light of this, extensive and diverse research is being carried out worldwide to
prepare a wide range of QKD solutions to enable widespread adoption of this un-
conditionally secure cryptographic technique. The work described herein specifically
targets the requirement for low cost and compact devices suitable for the general
public to carry out their daily cryptographic activities (such as banking or using the
internet).
The requirements for such a system are rather different than those for a QKD
system for, say, encrypting messages between government and military facilities; a
list of the requirements used to design the system is presented in table 1.1.
1.2 Cryptography
History It is conceivable that since the invention of writing, people have devised
methods with which to restrict who can read messages. Two practices related to this
are Steganography, the art of hiding the existence of messages [3] and Cryptography




To illustrate the difference, two examples from early history will be considered.
An example of Steganography from ancient Greek history is the story of Histiaeus
tattooing a message on a slave’s head and sending the slave to Aristagoras once the
hair had re-grown [5], this method masks the fact that a message has been sent at
all however the message is freely readable to anyone who knows of its presence.
Cryptography, however simply renders a message gibberish to all but those who
know how to decode it. One of the earliest examples, the Caesar Cipher is described
later in section 1.2.1. In short this performs a simple substitution wherein letters
are replaced with prearranged other letters. This message can then be sent openly
as it can only be decoded by its intended recipient.
One Directional Problems Whereas a “symmetric” scheme utilizes the same
key to encode and decode messages, there also exists an asymmetric method wherein
the encryption key is not the same as the decryption key and the message cannot
be decoded using only the encryption key [6]. The difference between these can be
visualised by considering sending messages in locked boxes.
In the symmetric scheme, both the sender and receiver simply possess a key
which opens a lock on a sealed box. The sender can then lock the box and upon
receipt of the locked box the receiver can use their copy of the key to unlock it. The
main issue of this system is the fact that the two parties need to have previously
met in order to possess the same keys.
If we continue with the analogy, the asymmetric scheme can avoid this issue by
starting with the receiver sending a customised open padlock to which they, and
they alone own the key, to the sender. The sender can then lock the box using this
lock and send the box safe in the knowledge that no parties other than the receiver




Knowledge and Computing power The holy grail of cryptography is the notion
of “unconditional security” which is defined as a ciphertext which is secure even if
the adversary has unlimited computing power [7]. Clearly, substitution ciphers
based on some rule known to both parties can be broken by either a brute-force
method of trying all possible substitutions or some sort of frequency analysis where
the relative occurrences of certain letters in the ciphertext are compared with the
relative occurrence of those letters in language.
This chapter discusses in detail the points discussed above and elucidates the
approaches developed towards the goal of unconditional security and the place that
this thesis holds within the environment of cryptographic applications.
1.2.1 Symmetric Schemes
1.2.1.1 Caesar Cipher
Symmetric cryptosystems are those in which the encryption and decryption keys
are the same [6]. An early example of such is called the Caesar Cipher due to the
stories surrounding Julius Caesar wishing to keep unwanted parties from reading
battle orders sent over long distances. The process of the Caesar cipher takes each
letter in a plaintext string and replaces it with a letter a fixed distance further along
the alphabet [4] (see figure 1.1). The obvious disadvantage of this system is that
once one knows that the Caesar cipher is being implemented, there are only 26
possible shifts to analyse for an attacker making it rather simple to break.
1.2.1.2 Vigenère Shift Cipher
Using the same idea as the Caesar cipher, the Vigenère shift cipher adds a further
level of complexity by adding a different shift to each letter in the plain text corre-




Figure 1.1: Example of a Caesar cipher plaintext and ciphertext. The shift applied
to the message is 1
the length of the plaintext and then each letter of the plaintext is shifted by the
alphabetical value of the keyword text (A = 1, B = 2 etc.) A table of the values
can be drawn to speed up manual encryption and decryption process (figure 1.2),
encryption is performed by finding the plaintext letter in the first column and the
keyword text letter in the first row and looking up the corresponding ciphertext
value and decryption by the reverse. This cipher adds a deal of complexity over the
Caesar cipher however if the key length is known, the problem can be broken down
into a series of Caesar ciphers which can be analysed individually.
Figure 1.2: The Vigenère shift cipher matrix renders encoding/decoding by hand




Figure 1.3: Example of a Vigenère cipher plaintext and ciphertext. The word used
to encode the message is “SECRET”
1.2.1.3 One Time Pad
A Vigenère Shift cipher with a random key with length equal to that of the plaintext
would be theoretically unbreakable however multiple reuses of the same key would
allow for analysis by collecting several ciphertexts and analysing in the same way
as previously. If the key were to never be reused again, this would constitute a one
time pad system [4] (sometimes referred to as a Vernam cipher [8]), called so as one
could imagine two parties sharing a notepad filled with pages of key where each page
would be used one time and discarded. This would be 100% secure as there is no
periodicity to analyze in the ciphertext.
1.2.2 Asymmetric Schemes
1.2.2.1 Diffie Hellman
Diffie-Hellman cryptography is based on the discrete logarithm problem [9], put
simply, it relies on the fact that given “ga (mod p)” and “gb (mod p)” it is difficult
to find “gab (mod p)” (terms defined below)
The secret, S, that is generated is possessed by Alice and Bob is a symmetric
key however it is discussed in the section addressing asymmetric systems since the
technique to obtain it is an asymmetric one. Once the method of obtaining S is





Alice and Bob publicly choose p, g where p is prime, g is primitive root (mod p)
1 [10]. They then secretly choose a, b respectively. They then calculate
A = ga mod p (1.1)
B = gb mod p (1.2)
respectively. Alice and Bob publicly declare A, B and compute, sa and sb:
sa = B
a mod p (1.3)
sb = A
b mod p (1.4)
respectively. Since
[










sa = sb = S (1.5)
Since at no point, a or b have been disclosed publicly, S constitutes a secret
shared key. This secret shared key can then be used in either a symmetric key
cryptosystem (described earlier) or as a public key cryptosystem in its own right as
follows:
Alice uses A (from above, A = ga mod p), g and p as her public key information.
Given this information Bob can choose a random b, send Alice gb mod p and a
message encrypted with gab mod p. Since only Alice knows a she is the only person
who can decrypt the message.
1For every odd prime p, there exists an integer, g, 1 < g < (1− p) such that gp−1 ≡ 1 (mod p)




Figure 1.4: Public Key Cryptography Schematic. Alice uses Bob’s public key to
encrypt a message, the message is decrypted only by Bob’s private key.
1.2.2.2 RSA
A more popular public key cryptography protocol is that of Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman (RSA) [11]. Generate your public and private key by:
Choose two primes p, q.
n = pq (1.6)
φ (n) = (p− 1) (q − 1) (1.7)
Choose e, must be coprime2 to φ (n) then calculate d where:
de mod φ (n) = 1 (1.8)
where the public key is n and e and the private key is d. Encryption of the




plaintext, t, and decryption of the ciphertext, c, are then respectively carried out
by:
c = te mod n (1.9)
t = cd mod n (1.10)
The efficacy of this protocol stems from the fact that multiplying two numbers
is a trivial operation but finding specific prime factors (without foreknowledge of
either factor) is hard. It is, however, unknown as to the exact relationship between
the difficulty of cracking RSA and the difficulty of finding prime factors, they are
at least equivalent but it is possible that there is an easier way to crack RSA [12].
This is known as the RSA Problem [13]
1.3 Quantum Computing
The two cryptosystems depicted in section 1.2.2 derive their security from problems
which are simple to compute in one direction and difficult to compute in the other
direction. There are no known classical algorithms which, in polynomial time3, can
solve either the integer factorization or discrete logarithm problems.
There is however, a quantum algorithm which, with specific modifications [2], can
solve either of the above problems. It uses a classical algorithm to reduce the problem
to that of finding the period of a function and then applies the quantum Fourier
transform. It is called Shor’s algorithm and has been validated experimentally in
solid state [14] and more recently on an integrated optical circuit [15]. This is
encouraging however current methods have depended on “compiled” systems, i.e.
3meaning that the relationship between the algorithm’s running time can be expressed as a
polynomial dependent on the input size.
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experiments specifically designed for a certain factorisation. A universal quantum
computer is fortuitously (for those that wish to continue encrypting!) much further
away however thought should be invested now as to future prospects and techniques
for cryptography.
It is worth mentioning that there is some effort into “post-quantum cryptogra-
phy” [16] which is a collection of cryptography techniques which rely on problems
not solvable by a quantum computer. Little attention will be given to these methods
in this thesis since the status of many of these are merely unknown regarding the
existence of efficient quantum algorithms. Instead we wish to establish a guaran-
teed solution depending inherently on the laws of physics rather than mathematical
computability.
1.4 No Cloning Theorem
Rather than simply running from the ever marching spectre of computational ad-
vancement, one might do better to achieve unconditional security through some
sort of law of nature. This can be done through the use of the “no cloning theo-
rem”. [17, 18]
In order to copy a classical bit, one simply needs to measure it and then prepare
as many further bits with the same value as the measured bit. This is not the case
with quantum bits (qubits) since a quantum measurement is nondeterministic and
results in collapse of the wavefunction into a random eigenvalue. It is then necessary
to investigate whether one could clone a bit using some operator on a system of a
target qubit and a “blank” qubit.
For the sake of argument the blank qubit will be considered to be in the inital
state |0〉. A copying operation, U, of a qubit X onto a blank, e, will then take:
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U |X〉 |e〉 → |X〉 |X〉 (1.11)
U |0〉 |0〉 → |0〉 |0〉 (1.12)
U |1〉 |0〉 → |1〉 |1〉 (1.13)
If we try to copy some arbitary state |ψ〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉:
U |ψ〉 |0〉 = U (a |0〉+ b |1〉) |0〉 (1.14)
= U (a |0〉 |0〉+ b |1〉 |0〉) (1.15)
= aU |0〉 |0〉+ bU |1〉 |0〉 (1.16)
From equations 1.12 and 1.13:
aU |0〉 |0〉+ bU |1〉 |0〉→a |0〉 |0〉+ b |1〉 |1〉 (1.17)
However since:
U |ψ〉 |0〉 → |ψ〉 |ψ〉 (1.18)
|ψ〉 |ψ〉 = (a |0〉+ b |1〉) (a |0〉+ b |1〉) (1.19)
= a2 |0〉 |0〉+ ab |0〉 |1〉+ ba |1〉 |0〉+ b2 |1〉 |1〉 (1.20)
Comparing equations 1.17 and 1.20, for a and b 6= 0:
a |0〉 |0〉+ b |1〉 |1〉 6=a2 |0〉 |0〉+ ab |0〉 |1〉+ ba |1〉 |0〉+ b2 |1〉 |1〉 (1.21)
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Hence we can copy a specific qubit but not an arbitary one. This raises frustrat-
ing issues in quantum computing (such as error corrections) but has some interesting
applications to be discussed further in section 1.5.
1.5 Quantum Key Distribution
1.5.1 Seeds of Quantum Cryptography
As discussed in section 1.3, there is clearly a necessity for Cryptography schemes that
are resistant to attack by quantum computer, the first steps to this were proposed
by Stephen Wiesner in the paper “Conjugate Coding”4 [20] in which Wiesner first
introduces a scheme for transmitting two messages in a manner such that only
one may be received. This scheme works on the basis that if the two messages
are encoded in the polarizations of photons, message 1 in the horizontal/vertical
polarization and message 2 on the left/right circular polarization information. A
piece of equipment can only be configured to measure one of the two messages
since measuring the circular polarization information destroys any linear polarization
information and vice versa so half of the information is lost.
The second schemeWiesner introduced is for “uncounterfeitable quantummoney”.
in this scheme, a unit of quantum money consists of a collection of two state quantum















The system then proceeds by encoding each component of the quantum money
into one of the four aforementioned states and noting these encodings alongside a
conventional serial number. If at any point the unit of quantum money is returned
to the quantum mint, the states can be measured and compared to those that were
initially encoded.
The uncounterfeitable nature stems here from the fact that a counterfeiter wishes
to create an exact copy of the unit of money requires exact information of the
states of the quantum systems that make up the unit. His problem lies in the fact
that a measurement distinguishing a from b necessarily removes information about
whether the state was in α or β. If he attempts to copy the money anyway, there
is a 50% chance he attempts to discriminate between the wrong pair of states and
thus leaves the money in the wrong state. Assuming the component has been left
in the incorrect state, when the mint remeasures the unit5 there is then a 50%
chance that the measurement will be orthogonal to that expected. This leads to a
50%×50% = 25% chance of discovery. Thus, if the unit of quantum money is made







which, renders a counterfeiting attempt less likely to succeed for increasing values
of n. For example, if n = 20, p = 0.00317 (less than half a percent)
Later, Charlie Bennett and Gilles Brassard [21] showed that encoding informa-
5since it prepared the states, it knows which is the correct basis they should be measured in
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tion in quantum systems could be used in a general way to share a random secret
key between two parties via a Quantum Channel which could then be used for the
key in the one time pad (OTP) cryptography scheme. Their scheme relied on using
photons as qubits which have the advantage of a very long decoherence time (com-
pared to the time taken to send them between Alice and Bob) which removed the




The Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol uses the principles of quantum me-
chanics in order to establish a random secret key known only to two parties, Alice
and Bob that is resistant to attacks from an Eavesdropper, Eve [21]. The process is
similar to that used in section 1.5.1 where the quantum states, a, b, α and β are im-
plemented as the polarization states horizontal, vertical, diagonal and antidiagonal
of single photons, hereby H, V, D, A respectively (figure 1.5).
Figure 1.5: The four states used in the BB84 protocol with polarized photons.
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(|ր〉 − |տ〉) (1.28)
where the factor of 1√
2
is necessary to normalise the amplitudes of the states.
Consider the action of a polarizer on these states; the polarizer can be represented
by |θ〉 〈θ|, where θ is the polarization orientation.
By this notation we can see that, as |〈a|b〉|2 is the probability b is in state a, the
action of a vertical polarizer, hereby denoted ⊕ on the horizontal or vertical states
are as follows:
⊕ |↑〉 = |↑〉 〈↑ | ↑〉 = |↑〉 (1.29)
⊕ |→〉 = |↑〉 〈→ | ↑〉 = 0 (1.30)
Hence we have a test for a photon to analyse whether it is in state |↑〉 or |→〉 (i.e.
horizontally or vertically polarized), if a photon is observed after the polarizer it
was V, if it is not observed it was H.
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However this is complicated by looking at the action of ⊕ on the diagonal/an-
tidiagonal states.




























and the same for |տ〉. This means that there is a 50% chance of observing the
photon (and 50% chance of it being absorbed) thus there is not a deterministic way
to measure an arbitrary polarization. This is a more application specific statement
of the no cloning theorem discussed in section 1.4.
Using this principle, Alice can send a stream of photons, each randomly encoded
in one of the four states from figure 1.5 to Bob who can measure them randomly
without concern as to whether he has measured them with a compatible measure-
ment or not. After Bob has signalled to Alice that he has received all of the qubits,
Alice then communicates, via a public, but authenticated classical channel, the bases
each qubit was encoded in. The important thing to note is that she does not reveal
the qubit value, only which measurement Bob should have made to know the state
with certainty. Alice and Bob can then both discard the values where the transmis-
sion and measurement bases do not match leaving them with identical lists without
having publicly transmitted them. An example key exchange is displayed in figure
1.6.
The security in this protocol stems from the principle that any measurement on
a quantum system will irrevocably modify the system. Consider a modification of
the above example wherein an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts all the qubits, measures
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Figure 1.6: An example BB84 key exchange resulting in a secret key of “001011”
them in the same way that Bob would and then, based on her measurements resends
these states to Bob. This is called the “intercept-resend attack” and is shown in
figure 1.7
Since Bob must have received all of the qubits before Alice reveals what bases
she transmitted in, Eve must send the values she measured onto Bob ‘blind’ and
thus with a possibility that she chose the incorrect basis to measure in. There is a
50% chance she will choose the incorrect basis and then, given that she chose the
incorrect basis a further 50% chance that the measurement will yield an incorrect
result.
Due to this incontrovertible fact of quantum physics, Alice and Bob, upon public
discussion, select a subset of their shared string and compare the values of the subset
and discard them. The presence of the eavesdropper will be revealed by discrepancies
in 25% of the values in their substrings.
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Figure 1.7: Schematic of the Intercept Resend attack. Eve places a detector between
Alice and Bob to collect all of Alice’s transmissions and then sends the results of
her measurements onto Bob. In this case Eve has no control of the public channel.
1.5.2.2 Other Protocols
E91: EPR Based Ekert’s E91 protocol [22] is a scheme which uses an entangled
system (such as an EPR state [23]) to share qubits between Alice and Bob, keeping
pairs where they both made the same measurement on their particle and then tests
for eavesdropping by checking for violations of Bell’s inequality [24], this protocol has
also been demonstrated using photon pairs from parametric downconversion [25,26]
which is equivalent to an EPR system. Some security proofs of BB84 [27, 28] are
based on E91 by “replacing all classical randomness by quantum entanglement and
postponing all measurements” [29]. This system is useful and some systems [30]
have used the principle of two parties measuring an entangled source even though
the source was co-located with one of the parties. In spite of the usefulness of this
protocol, it requires both parties to have detectors (expensive) and some source of
entanglement (expensive and delicate).
B92: Two State Protocol
In [31] it is shown that it is sufficient for QKD to only use two nonorthogonal
states, encoding one bit value on one state and one on the other. To use the
BB84 terminology, this is like encoding |↑〉 as 1 and |ր〉 as 0. [31] also suggests
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an implementation of the protocol in a fiber based scheme, coding the qubits in
phase, which is displayed in figure 1.8. Alice and Bob possess similar apparatus
connected via a fiber optic link. The apparatus consist of two asymmetric beam
splitters (ABS) - meaning they reflect a far higher proportion of light than they
transmit - and a 0/180◦ phase shifting element in the “dim” (transmission) arm of
the arrangement (PSA and PSB). When Alice injects a bright pulse into the system,
the first beam splitter splits the light into a dim beam to the phase shifter and a
bright beam which travels along the long arm of her apparatus picking up a delay of
∆T . These beams are recombined at the second ABS and enter the fiber and into
Bob’s apparatus. The same arrangement in Bob means that there are three arrival
events at Bob’s detector.
1: (Figure 1.8(b)). The highly dimmed pulse that travelled through both Alice
and Bob’s phase shifters arrives. This is discarded as it contains no valuable
information.
2: (Figure 1.8(c)). The pulse phase shifted by Alice and delayed by Bob and the
pulse delayed by Alice and phase shifted at Bob arrive onto the final UBS
simultaneously. Depending on whether Alice and Bob chose the same phase
shifts or not, the pulses will interfere either constructively (and be detected)
if Alice and Bob chose the same phase shifts or destructively (and not be
detected) if they chose different phase shifts. This event generates the key
information as Bob can communicate for which pulses a detection was observed
without communicating the state of the phase shifter.
3: (Figure 1.8(d)). The twice delayed bright pulse arrives, this contains no key
information however does permit Bob to monitor the channel losses relative
to the signal pulses and detect eavesdropping.
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(a) No light in apparatus (b) Pulse is phase shifted in Alice and Bob
(discarded)
(c) Pulse Phase shifted in Alice delayed by
Bob (light line) and vice versa (dark line)
(signal)
(d) Pulse delayed by Alice and Bob (moni-
tors eavesdropping)
Figure 1.8: The B92 Protocol performed with phase encoding. Image order as seen
from Bob’s detections. Fine dotted black lines denote empty channels, light and
dark solid lines used to show when two separate light paths are present in apparatus
(striped lines denote shared path).
This implementation can be considered as a large interferometer shared between
Alice and Bob however since both arms travel in the same fiber, there are no issues
with misalignment or unintended asymmetry in the phase changes. This makes
it an ideal fiber based system but a lousy free space protocol. This protocol has
also been demonstrated in free space [32] where they monitored for Eavesdropping
by utilizing two detectors in the receiver and reasoning that an attack which Eve
intercepts Alice’s signals and forwards very bright pulses when she makes a detection
(to counteract the loss that she will introduce by not forwarding all of the signals),
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Six State Protocol An interesting refinement over the BB84 protocol is that
when a third basis is added [33], this increases the error Eve introduces to the





. The level of increased sensitivity to eavesdropping is deemed
not sufficiently beneficial in terms of applicability to this work considering both the
drop in protocol efficiency and the added complexity of the apparatus that would
be required to generate and detect the extra states.
Range extension
Whilst not a protocol per se, with imperfect qubit sources and detectors, there
exists a limit to the length of a quantum channel. This limit occurs because as the
channel gets longer, the losses increase while the noise (dark counts, background)
remain the same, thus reducing the signal/noise ratio. At some distance this entirely
compromises the transmission as all errors in the sifted key must be considered due
to the Eavesdroppper. There exists, however a method of splitting the quantum
channel into some number of shorter subchannels over which key can be generated.
This process utilizes the process of entanglement swapping [34], wherein Alice
and Bob each share an entangled pair of particles with a third party, Charlie. If
Charlie performs the correct measurement on his particles, the result will be that
Alice and Bob’s particles will be entangled. Figure 1.9 shows this (d) and other
methods (a-c) for extending the range of the quantum channel.
Unfortunately this process has, thus far, assumed perfect sources and detec-
tors (the source of the problem in the first place!). This is not a problem however
since [36] shows that a weak source of entanglement can be “distilled” into a stronger
entanglement at the expense of some of the entangled pairs simply by ”Local Oper-
ations and Classical Communication” (LOCC).
The current limit to introducing quantum repeaters is that since the entangle-
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Figure 1.9: Quantum relays with an increasing number of nodes. a) shows a simple
link between Alice and Bob. b) shows how the link length can be easily doubled by
placing a source of entanglement in the middle of the channel. c) shows a situation
where one half of the entangled is sent to “T” who uses it to teleport the state
from Alice onto the half of the pair which was sent to Bob. d) shows the situation
described in the text where the central point “Sw” posesses one half of Alice’s
entangled pair and one half of Bob’s. “Sw” then performs a measurement to entangle
the photons at Alice and Bob. Figure adapted from one in [35]
ment between two nodes may not be established at the same time, it must be stored
in a quantum memory until its neighbouring nodes are ready to perform the oper-
ations [37]. A candidate for a design is the DLCZ protocol which utilizes atomic
ensembles as quantum memories and fairly simple optical components for process-
ing, the efficiency of this protocol scales inversely with distance, an improvement
over the non-repeater method which scales exponentially [38].
1.5.3 Attacks
While QKD (and specifically in this case, BB84) theoretically guarantee security,
this assumes that all of the components are ideal, this is clearly not the case [39–41].
In order to achieve security, non-ideal components must be identified and analysed
to nullify the weaknesses of the implementation.
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Intercept-Resend The simplest attack on a QKD system is the intercept-resend
attack. This is the process mentioned in section 1.5.2 and displayed in figure 1.7 to
which QKD is secure against. In brief, Eve intercepts all/part of the qubit stream
between Alice and Bob, measures what she intercepted and resends the states she
measured. As long as Alice and Bob can communicate with each other, they can
detect Eve’s presence; they can compare a small, random subset of their results and
will observe an increased proportion of bit errors (quantum bit error rate (QBER))
if Eve measured any of the qubits.
Man In The Middle A more powerful attack based on the intercept-resend attack
is if Eve can convince Alice that she is Bob and vice-versa. In this way, two secret
keys are generated, kAE between Alice and Eve and kEB between Eve and Bob. In
this case, Alice will send her encoded messages to someone she thinks is Bob but
actually turns out to be Eve, who can decode the message using kAE, read it and
then re-encode using kEB. The man in the middle (MITM) attack is illustrated in
figure 1.10.
Figure 1.10: Schematic of the man in the middle attack. As in figure 1.7, Eve
collects all of Alice’s transmission and sends on her measurements to Bob. In this
case however she somehow manipulates the public channel to masquerade to Alice
that she is Bob and vice versa. In this case Alice and Bob do not generate a shared
key with each other, rather they both share separate keys with Eve.
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The way in which the MITM attack can be avoided is by use of an authenticated
channel between Alice and Bob wherein Alice and Bob can be 100% sure they are
talking to each other. One way of doing this is to communicate a small amount
of a previously agreed secret key to verify their identities. Since this method has
shared key as a prerequisite, this requires the idea of quantum key distribution to
be changed to that of quantum key expansion6.
Side Channels In a recently declassified NSA document from 1972 [42], a range of
vulnerabilities were discussed utilizing information leakage from any cryptosystems
which could compromise security, this problem was given the codename TEMPEST.
Attacks based on this information leakage are called side channel attacks. Some
examples of exploitable leakage are given below:
• Electromagnetic fields being emitted from a device which could contain key
or plaintext information. (initial problem that alerted researchers and caused
the initiation of TEMPEST)
• Differing power draw dependent on which parts of the system are active.
• In the case of a system with mechanical parts, the actual sound made by the
device could be used to work out certain information. A joke mentioned in [43]
is that “the device provided unconditional security against a deaf eavesdrop-
per”.
Photon Number Splitting (PNS) It is difficult to manufacture a “true” photon
source which probabilistically and deterministically emits one and only one photon
on demand [44]. All is not lost however, if a pulsed light source is attenuated such
6which is actually a problem which also exists in classical cryptography so cannot necessarily
be considered as a criticism.
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that the average number of photons per pulse is less than one, QKD can still be
performed albeit with some added complexity.
The probability an attenuated pulse from a source with a mean photon number
µ will contain N photons is given by a Poisson distribution [45].




This clearly adds the possibility that the pulse contains more than one photon,
which is bad news since it means Eve can split the pulse and measure it without
interfering with Bob’s measurement. To ensure a low proportion of multiphoton
pulses, µ must be much less than one (figure 1.11).
(a) µ = 1 (b) µ = 0.1
Figure 1.11: Probability a pulse from a source with mean photon number µ will
contain N photons. Observe that even though single photons are required, µ = 1
produces a large proportion of multiphoton pulses compared to the situation where
µ = 0.1
Eve has access to all information about the devices used in the QKD system
and this allows her to plan an optimal photon number splitting (PNS) attack. The
parameters used in this example are taken from the example in [46] and provide the
clearest explanation however in theory any numbers can be used. The attack also
depends on Eve possessing a perfectly lossless channel which may sound unrealistic
but is not forbidden by the laws of physics so therefore must be considered accessible
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to Eve. In this example Alice’s pulsed source has a 90% probability of emitting a
single photon pulse and a 10% chance of emitting a multiphoton pulse. Now if
we assume the channel loss is 90% (such as would be the case in long distance
implementations) then Eve’s optimal strategy would be to intercept all of Alice’s
signals, blocking all of those containing only single photons and storing one photon
from each multiphoton pulse while forwarding the other(s) along a lossless channel
to Bob. From Bob’s point of view, 10% of the signals are still reaching him so
suspicion is not aroused however all photons received have a copy possessed by Eve
who can retain them7 and measure them once Alice and Bob have publicly discussed
their bases.
This attack places a constraint on the maximum photon number of the source:
y > pm (1.36)
y > (1 + µ) e−µ (1.37)
where y is the yield of the quantum channel (proportion of the signals which are
detected) and pm is the probability that the source emits a multiphoton pulse. This
means that as the yield decreases (loss increases), less multiphoton pulses can be
tolerated.
A countermeasure to this attack which removes the dependence on channel loss is
discussed later section 1.5.3.1. Due to the immaturity of true single photon sources,
the QKD security proofs (section 1.6) consider the use of imperfect devices such
as attenuated pulsed sources and the value of µ can be optimised (figure 1.12) to
provide the highest secret key rate.
7again, Eve must be afforded any operation which is not forbidden by the laws of Physics
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Figure 1.12: A graph of the rate (per transmitted bit) of BB84 for various photon
numbers indicating there is an optimum value of µ dependent on the system param-
eters. In this example the yield is 10%. This is calculated from the GLLP proof
discussed in section 1.6.
Indistinguishability If different devices are used for generating each qubit state,
then great thought must be given to the indistinguishability of the photons, if, for
example, there is a large difference between the wavelengths of each source, then a
dichroic beamsplitter could be used to determine, with precision, which source, and
consequently which qubit state the photon was sent in. This must be dealt with by
control of spectral intensities of the sources and tight spectral filtering at the output
of the Alice optical device.
If the weakly pulsed source is a laser, then there is phase information in the pulses
which could be exploited for an attack. In order for this to be counteracted, active
phase randomization must be employed. A simpler solution is to use an incoherent
source such as an LED.
Back Flash An issue based on detection is due to the fact that the carriers in
a single photon avalanche diode (SPAD) can recombine [47] a short time after an
avalanche creating a back flash which, in the case of the 4 detector BB84 system
would give information as to which state Bob measured [39]. Mercifully, this re-
emitted light intensity is not evenly spread across the spectrum and so the signal
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photon wavelength can be chosen such that narrow spectral filtering can be employed
to only allow the transmission of signal photons and blocking the back flash photons
(from [39], filtering all wavelengths above 700nm should suffice).
Blinding Another detector based attack is one which utilizes the imperfection of
the detectors themselves. Makarov [48, 49] discovered that, using a laser beam of
specific power, a SPAD can be put into “saturation” mode until the laser beam
intensity is reduced, de-saturating the SPAD whereupon it will produce a signal as
if it had just detected a photon. Using several laser beams at various polarizations
and intensities, it is possible to saturate all detectors in a passive BB84 system and
cause single detectors to click at will. This attack makes Eve far more powerful
when performing the intercept-resend attack since she can make it such that Bob
will detect the same state that she did with certainty by choosing the appropriate
laser pulses. When Alice then transmits the bases, Eve and Bob will end up keeping
the same qubit measurements and thus will end up with the same key.
The generality of this attack is still under debate; [50] suggests various counter-
measures and situations where the attack may not work.
This attack has also been experimentally carried out against an established sys-
tem [51]. The authors also recommend further countermeasures which could neu-
tralise the attack [52].
1.5.3.1 Improvements on BB84
Further enhancements can be made to the basic BB84 protocol discussed in section
1.5.2.1 for enhanced security or key rate. The modifications discussed below consist
of, at worst, trivial modifications to the practical setup of a BB84 system.
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Basis Choice Bias Due to the random basis choice performed at Alice and Bob,
the inherent efficiency of the protocol discussed above is at best 50%. Ardehali
et al. [53] suggested that if Alice and Bob use a pre-chosen bias to one basis or the
other, their measurements will agree far more than if they were to choose a simple
50:50 basis choice. This scheme, however, opens an obvious issue that since in the
security proof of QKD, one has to assume that Eve knows everything about Alice
and Bob’s devices, if this were the case then Eve could simply eavesdrop only the
basis with a high choice bias and gain a large portion of information of the key
without disrupting many of the qubits due to her high probability of making the
correct bias choice.
The solution to this issue is simple, Alice and Bob must, instead of comparing
the QBER for the entire transmission, compare the QBER separately for each basis.
Consider the case when Alice and Bob choose the two bases with probability
p and 1 − p, where 0.5 < p < 1. Eve’s optimal strategy would be to eavesdrop
only in the p basis. Under normal error checking, this would introduce an error of
(p−1)
2
, which, in the case that p becomes asymptotically close to 1 would result in a
negligible error contribution.
If, however, the QBER is calculated separately for each basis, the QBER in the
p basis will be 0 since Eve is always choosing the correct basis however since Eve’s
optimal strategy for eavesdropping is always measuring in the incorrect basis in the
1− p channel, there will be a 50% QBER in the other channel.
Obviously, as p moves away from 0.5 the number of bits available for error
estimation decreases and thus Eve has a better chance of eavesdropping undetected,
a suitable value for p must be chosen. It has been shown [54] that the optimal p
scales with key length by:
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where k = length of final key, N = number of qubits shared. Meaning that as
N → ∞, p→ 0+.
This result is not taken into consideration in the GLLP security proof (section
1.6.1) since it deals with the asymptotic limit but it is taken into consideration in
the finite-key proof (section 1.6.2) which deals in general with the issue of having
sufficient bits to estimate the QBER accurately.
Decoy States [46] introduces the concept of decoy pulses, that is, introducing a
number of pulses from a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source that have a high µ so
that it emits a higher proportion of multiphoton pulses. This protocol significantly
improves BB84 protocol against the PNS attack discussed in section 1.5.3.
The Decoy State protocol introduces two sets of states to be emitted by Alice,
those with mean photon number µ and those with µ′. Now, after the transmission,
Alice can publicly reveal, along with the basis as in standard BB84, whether the
pulse was from the decoy source or the signal source. Since Eve’s optimal intercept-
resend strategy discussed in section 1.5.3 is to block all single photon pulses and
split the multiphoton pulses, the losses in each case can then be compared and if the
losses of signal pulses are higher than the losses in decoy pulses then eavesdropping
is detected and Eve is foiled.
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A striking feature of equation 1.39 is that this criterion does not depend on the
channel loss, meaning security is maintained for a given system regardless of the loss
(eg, changing channel distance).
Detailed security analysis of this protocol can be found in [55,56].
SARG04 In a 2004 paper, Scarani et al. [57] proposed a modification to the BB84
Protocol, differing only in the classical sifting stage allowing this new protocol to
be trivially implemented on an existing BB84 system. The protocol will hereby be
referred to as SARG04 and a brief description will follow.
For simplicity in this specific explanation, a slightly different notation will be
employed. Here, the four states transmitted by Alice will be denoted by |±x〉 and
|±z〉 and the measurements made by Bob denoted by σx and σz where:
σx |+x〉 = +1 (1.40)
σx |−x〉 = −1 (1.41)
σx |+z〉 = ±1 (1.42)
σx |−z〉 = ±1 (1.43)
and the inverse for σz.
As in “standard” BB84, Alice chooses randomly one of the four states from
|±x〉 , |±z〉 and Bob chooses randomly one of the measurements σx, σz. Now, instead
of communicating the basis Alice sent in, ie transmitting |±x〉 or |±z〉 with one state
in each basis corresponding to 0 or 1; Alice announces to a pair of nonorthogonal
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henceforth referred to by Aw,w′ = {|wx〉 , |w′z〉}.
The second difference is the correspondence between states and key bit values
with |±x〉 corresponding to 0 and |±z〉 corresponding to 1. Bob can then compare
his obtained measurement with the possible results his chosen measurement will
produce if enacted on A to see whether his obtained measurement allows definite
knowledge of the received state.
Figure 1.13 shows a sample bit transmission and the range of measurement out-
comes. If Alice sends |+x〉 and Bob measures σx he will definitely measure +1.
However, since σx |±z〉 can also yield +1, whichever A Alice announces Bob will
have to throw away his result. (rows a and c)
If Bob measures σz however, he will measure either +1 or -1 with 50% probability
each. If Alice announces A++ then since σz |+z〉 = +1, if Bob measured -1 then
he knows that the state he measured must have been |+x〉 (row b). Conversely, if
Alice announces A+− then Bob knows with certainty that a +1 result from a σz
measurement corresponds to the |+x〉 state (row c).
If one completes the analysis for the instances when Alice sends |−x〉 and |±z〉
then there is an extra factor of 1
2
due to the fact that even if Bob choses the correct
basis (which, as in BB84 he will do half of the time) there is still a further 1
2
chance
that the measurement will not yield a usable bit. This extra factor of 1
2
reduces the
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Figure 1.13: An example transfer of a single bit using the SARG04 sifting method.
In situation a), Bob measures σx on |+x〉 and measures +1 with certainty, Alice
declared that she either sent |+x〉 or |+z〉. Since σx of either of these can give a
measurement outcome of +1, Bob cannot be sure whether he detected|+x〉 or |+z〉.
In situation b) on the other hand, if Bob measures σz, he will measure +1 or -1 with
equal probability, in the case that he measured +1, as in a) either of |+x〉 or |+z〉
could have caused that outcome however the only way -1 could have been measured
is if the state was |+x〉 (which occurs half of the time σz is performed on |+x〉. The
same logic can be applied to lines c and d of the figure and for |+x〉 and |±z〉 (not
shown) to compute all of the possible permutations.
It is shown in further detail in [58] that the SARG04 protocol is secure against
PNS attacks under conditions where BB84 is provably insecure for both single pho-
ton sources and WCP sources. It also compares the performance of SARG04 and
BB84 for a range of distances wherein BB84 is found to be better at short distances
(ie when losses are still small so the protocol efficiency is the dominant factor) and
therefore whilst it could be of academic interest, SARG04 is not suitable for obtain-





The security of QKD is guaranteed only if idealized devices are used so any real
world application needs to be analysed based on how much information it leaks to
a theoretical eavesdropper. To discuss this a basic QKD process will be laid out.
Alice prepares data The first step for the transfer is for Alice to generate a ran-
dom string of bit pairs which can be converted into polarizations states of
qubits by, eg. 00 ⇒ |↑〉, 01 ⇒ |→〉, 10 ⇒ |ր〉 and 11 ⇒ |տ〉. As long as Alice
and Bob agree on this mapping it can be any permutation of this.
Transmission Alice then transmits weak pulses with the polarization states she
generated. Bob randomly chooses the H/V or D/A basis to measure each
photon and records the times of the detections.
Raw Key Generation Since every pulse from Alice did not contain a photon and
Bob’s detectors are not 100% efficient. Bob now possesses a sparse list of
detections and their measurement outcome. Bob then shares some subset of
his sparse list with Alice which is used to estimate the QBER and determine
the synchronisation offset between the data sets.
Error Correction Even in the absence of eavesdropping, due to imperfect state
preparation and measurement and also dark counts in the detectors, there will
be a nonzero number of errors in the sifted keys which need to be removed
for the keys to be any use. An error correction code is utilized to recursively
check for errors without revealing the key information.
Privacy Amplification Some sort of hashing is performed to reduce the amount of
information a theoretical eavesdropper could have on the key to zero. Although




non-eavesdropping source, these errors must be attributed to the eavesdropper
anyway and therefore constitute information leaked.
This section will concern itself with the amount of information leaked and, com-
bining that with the mean photon number and the channel losses, estimate how
many secret bits per qubit sent by Alice will be generated.
1.6.1 Infinite bound
As discussed in section 1.5.2 there is a threshold QBER of 25% at which it must
be assumed that the quantum transmission has been compromised and any key
generated is not secure. In real world applications of QKD however, this is not
Eve’s optimal strategy for eavesdropping as she can utilize the imperfections in the
devices in the system to gain information on the key without increasing the QBER.
In this case the no cloning theorem discussed in section 1.4 is no longer sufficient
and a more rigorous security analysis must be undertaken. The result from this
analysis must then be used to optimize the parameters of the apparatus and discern
the maximum tolerable QBER.
The quantum channel is “noisy” Any errors resulting from noise/loss in the
quantum channel must be attributed to Eve since she could, in theory, replace
the channel with a quieter/less lossy one and reintroduce the noise/loss by
way of eavesdropping.
Alice does not use a single photon source It must be assumed that all multi-
photon pulses emitted by a WCP Alice are intercepted by Eve and used to
gain key information.
Bob’s detectors are not perfectly efficient If Eve had the technology, she could
modify Bob’s detectors to be more efficient and then attack sufficient photons




Expanding work carried out by [27, 59–61] assuming various imperfect device
scenarios, the GLLP proof [62] introduced a second attacker, Fred, who has the
power of tampering with the source and detector.
GLLP also formulated an expression for the maximum key generation rate given









where ∆ is the probability that a qubit is ‘tagged’8, δ is the QBER and H2 is
the Shannon Entropy function [7] defined by:
H2 (x) = −x log2 (x)− (1− x) log2 (1− x) (1.46)
equation 1.45 can be rewritten in terms of easily measurable parameters of the
experiment [63] as:










where Nµs is the number of signals for which Alice and Bob used the same basis







where Kµs is the number of detections made by Bob, making Qµ the probability
a given occasion upon which Alice and Bob agree on the basis will result in a bit
of sifted key, this can be calculated by considering the mean photon number of the





where Kerrors is an incorrect bit in the sifted key, making Eµ the QBER, which is




where Y1 is the chance Bob will make a single photon detection given Alice emits one
and µ is the mean photon number of the WCP source, or, as per [63] for non-decoy
BB84:




where pM is the probability of Alice sending a multiphoton state (see equations





Substituting these specific expressions for Q1 and e1 into equation 1.47
R ≥ q
(








In addition to giving an expression for the optimal mean photon number µ as in
figure 1.12. It also shows an interesting result that the optimal µ will never exceed
η and will only tend towards η as the QBER tends towards zero (shown in figure
1.14 as an unrealistic QBER of 0.1%9). This is because of the information leakage
in the PNS attack.
Figure 1.14: The optimal mean photon number, µ, depends on the yield, η, and the






The problem with the GLLP proof (and those which preceded it) is that the QBER
is required to determine the amount of privacy amplification necessary for an un-
conditionally secure key. This QBER is estimated by using a small subset of the
sifted key, which, tends towards the real QBER for an infinite key however for a key
of finite length this QBER needs to be upper bounded and, since Eve can get infor-
mation “for free” on any multiphoton pulses, the single photon yield (proportion of
pulses which contained a single photon) needs to be lower bounded also.
Using the formulation of conditional entropies of Devetak and Winter [64] which
expresses the rate as:
r = H(X|E)−H(X|Y ) (1.55)
where H(a|b) are conditional von Neumann entropies (which become Shannon
entropies when the systems are classical) signifying the mutual information possessed
by (Alice and Eve) and (Alice and Bob), respectively.
For the sake of completeness, for infinite key, this becomes [65]:
r = p2z (S(X|E)− leakEC) (1.56)
where:


















during error correction, Q is the total QBER, ν̃S is the transmission rate of Al-
ice divided by the proportion of detections make up the sifted key and pm is the
proportion of Alice’s pulses which contain more than one photon.
The problem discussed in [66] is that S(X|E) needs to be expressed in terms of
a security parameter which expresses the precision to which it is estimated. The










where n is the fraction of the data N which is used for key, Sξ(X|E) is the


















leakEC = 1.05h(e) (1.61)
where ǭ is the security parameter associated with the parameter estimation and
ǫPA is the security parameter associated with privacy amplification.
For BB84 without Decoy States, Sξ(X|E) is given to be [67]













A striking difference between the finite key method and the asymptotic method
is that the finite key method predicts negative key rates for N . 105 [66] and only
arrive at the asymptotic values for N ≈ 1010.
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1.7 Free Space QKD
1.7.1 Experimental History
The first experimental realisation of QKD was presented in a paper by Bennett,
Bessette, Brassard, Salvail and Smolin in 1992 [19] and consisted of a pulsed green
LED which was collimated, filtered and horizontally polarized before being rotated
by a pockels cell which can rotate the horizontally polarized light into any of the
four states required in the BB84 protocol (this experiment used H, V, L and R
polarizations). Following a 32cm free space channel a second pockels cell set to
perform no rotation or to rotate L/R to H/V (and vice versa), a polarizing beam
splitter discriminating between H/V (therefore L/R if the second pockels cell was
active) directed the light onto photomultiplier tubes. A photograph of this apparatus
can be seen in figure 1.15. A sample data collection run is provided in the paper
which details that 715,000 pulses were sent by Alice in 10 minutes, an average
repetition rate of 1.1kHz.
Figure 1.15: A photograph of the apparatus used in the BBBSS demonstration of
QKD. Image taken from [19], original labelling edited for clarity.
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(a) Two detector passive QKD receiver (b) Four detector passive QKD receiver
Figure 1.16: The methods of randomly choosing measurement bases proposed by
Rarity, Owens and Tapster. Images taken from [68]
The methods of randomly choosing transmission and measurement states were
refined in a paper by Rarity, Owens and Tapster in 1994 [68] which proposed re-
placing the pockels cells with beam splitters and either placing a polarizing beam
splitter (PBS) on the transmitted and reflected arms (figure 1.16(a)) or putting a
fiber delay on one arm and recombining after a delay (figure 1.16(b)) retaining the
ability for two detectors to discriminate between the four states. The BBBSS ex-
periment required 60µS to stabilize after each rotation whereas this paper rightfully
points out that “As the beam splitter acts passively, there is no maximum switching
rate and the data rate is limited only by the detector time resolution”10
In a 1998 paper Buttler et al. [32] at Los Alamos demonstrated QKD over 1km
of free space at night time. Their system maintained a pockels cell for state prepa-
(a) Transmitter (b) Receiver
Figure 1.17: The apparatus used in the 1km Los Alamos experiment. Images taken
from [32]
10A direct quote from section 4 of the paper
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ration (figure 1.17(a)) but used a 50:50 beam splitter in the detection process (figure
1.17(b); the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol was utilized but the principle is the same).
The transmission rate detailed in this paper is 20kHz.
Rather than rotating the polarization of a single beam, Rarity et al. [69] ex-
changed key over 1.9km by using a set of beam splitters to generate four beams
from one laser, polarized each individually and then used acousto-optical switches
to select which of the four beams would be routed to the output of the transmitter
(figure 1.18(a). The detection system used the time multiplexed version of the beam
splitter design from [68](figure 1.18(b)).
(a) Transmitter (b) Receiver
Figure 1.18: The apparatus used in 1.9km experiment of Rarity et al. Images taken
from [69]
A further result from Los Alamos by Hughes et al. in 2002 [70] extended the
distance to 10km in day and night conditions. This system utilized four polarized
diode lasers being combined using 50:50 beam splitters and symmetrically the detec-
tor comprised a 50:50 beam splitter and two PBS as described earlier (figure 1.19).
The clock rate in this system was also increased to 1MHz.
44
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.7. FREE SPACE QKD
Figure 1.19: The apparatus used in the 10km Los Alamos experiment. Images taken
from [70]
Also in 2002, Kurtsiefer et al. [71] performed a 23.4km experiment at night
between two mountains in Germany. This system used the beamsplitter design in
its detection module however implemented a novel design in combining the polarized
laser diode beams. The beams were arranged around a conical mirror and spatially
filtered (figure 1.20). This paper also reported performance in adverse conditions
and reasoned that the performance meant that ground to satellite transmissions
were feasible.
Figure 1.20: The apparatus used by Kurtsiefer et al. for the 23.4km experiment.
Image taken from [71]
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Figure 1.21: The apparatus used by Ursin et al. for the 144km experiment. Image
taken from [30]
The current furthest free space QKD link (144km) was reported by Ursin et al.
in 2007 [30] between La Palma and Tenerife. This process actually used an entan-
glement protocol wherein both parties must receive qubits (see figure 1.21). Shor’s
security proof [27] proves that this is equivalent to BB84 and even so, much of the
required apparatus is the same anyway. The beam wander from the f/38 telescope
was much larger than the size of the detectors so an f/5 beam reducer was employed
to reduce the wander down to less than 500µm. To this end a detector arrange-
ment was devised which placed a 50mm lens before the first beam splitter however
this was not completed in time and a scheme utilizing 50mm lenses in front of each
detector was implemented instead.
The unused long range detector unit has evolved into the f/5 design utilized in
this thesis. The f/5 optics is not strictly necessary (the beam wander over 10cm is
negligible) however it does mean that it would be relatively simple to re-purpose the
“Quantum ATM” unit for long range QKD experiments.
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1.7.2 The Bristol System
What follows is a brief history of the Bristol low cost QKD system and its evolution
to the current specifications. Before the f/5 design was integrated into the Bristol
short range system, a compact detection system was employed which was shown by
Duligall et al. [72]. In this system, four LEDs were combined onto a two dimensional
diffraction grating (hereby a diffractive optical element (DOE)) and then spatially
filtered with pinholes. In a symmetric arrangement, the collimated beam sent across
the quantum channel was split by a further DOE onto one of four detectors each with
a polarizer across them such that each detected one of the four BB84 polarizations.
This reduces the protocol efficiency by 1
2
for the sake of size and simplicity but in the
end it was decided that since the detection unit will reside in the “Quantum ATM”,
size is not really of issue and, in fact, due to available modifications [54] to the
BB84 protocol (discussed in section 1.5.3.1) it is desirable to be able to choose the
weighting of the random basis choice which requires the beam splitter arrangement.
(a) DOE beam combiner
(b) DOE beam separator
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1.7.3 The system as of the commencing of this thesis
The work detailed in this thesis commenced October 2007. At this point the system
consisted of Alice and Bob optical devices each bolted to an optical bench figure
1.23. The Alice optics were as described in section 1.7.2, four LEDs incident on a
diffraction grating to collimate and filtered by pinholes. The Bob optics inherited
was a design of the sort shown in figure 1.19 and figure 1.20, namely using a 50:50
beamsplitter for basis choice and a PBS for each measurement in the bases. This
design placed each PBS on a tip/tilt platform however this meant that the beams
transmitted by each PBS needed to be aligned simultaneously.
To analyse the timing, a GuideTech GT653 time interval analyser (TIA) was
utilized, this only had two channels so in each basis one signal was delayed by half a
clock cycle and combined with the undelayed pulse. This had the effect of doubling
the apparent background in each channel.
Figure 1.23: A photograph of the Alice (bottom right) and Bob (top left) devices






Quantum Cryptography is arguably the first commercial application of quantum
information research and there are currently several companies offering QKD solu-
tions [74–76]. An example system is the Clavis 2 produced by idQuantique depicted
in figure 1.24. While these are perfectly appropriate for applications wherein the
large size and considerable cost are of little issue (government, military), there are
currently no small or low cost systems suitable for the consumer market. One might
consider this to be of little consequence if one compares the relative sensitivity of
the data an average person might want to communicate to that of a country or large
multinational, and to a certain extent that is true for the time being however section
1.2 has elucidated the necessity for a widespread implementation for QKD in most
situations where classical cryptosystems are currently used.





The general idea for a consumer QKD system is depicted in figure 1.25 wherein
several small devices can all establish key with a centralised terminal which can
then be used for some kind of cryptographic application. Two possible applications
are described here.
Figure 1.25: Cartoon of the system application discussed in this thesis consisting of
many hand held devices and a single terminal device
1.9.1 Banking Authentication
Perhaps the most compelling use scenario for the requirement of a consumer oriented
QKD system is to replace the current “chip and pin” infrastructure which is based on
the Europay, MasterCard and VISA (EMV) Standard [77]. This system can secure
point of sale (POS) and automated teller machine (ATM) transactions and also,
alongside another device (such as Barclays’ chip authentication program (CAP),
known as PINSentry which can be seen in figure 1.26 [78]) can secure remote trans-




Figure 1.26: Picture of the Barclays CAP Device, PINSentry
The EMV standards rely on “classical” cryptographic principles [77], which sec-
tion 1.3 showed do not guarantee security. The work described in this thesis proposes
a replacement for this specification based on the unconditionally secure technology
of quantum cryptography. The technical challenge is to miniaturize the hardware
such that the consumer device is of no greater size than the existing CAP readers.
1.9.2 Access Control
Since the user device suggested in section 1.9.1 is necessarily small and low cost, a
similar infrastructure could be implemented in any situation where a 100% robust
access control system is required. Suggestions for such situations are:
• Physical access control to sensitive areas such as in military or government
facilities.
• Electronic access control to any sort of important computer system and/or
encryption of secret data.





Continuing from the progress discussed in section 1.7.2, this thesis details a QKD
system suitable for widespread deployment in a consumer setting. The principal
novelty in the system is the great discrepancy between the size and cost of the “Alice”
and “Bob” devices which is the basis for the applicability in widespread applications.
Much of the work undertaken in this thesis has concentrated on miniaturizing the
optics of the Alice device and refining various aspects of the system to increase the
speed and reliability of key generation.
The work comprises:
• Contributing to the building and testing of a prototype integrated system
incorporating repeatable alignment system, on board processing and wireless
public channel (Chapter 2 and chapter 5).
• Work towards miniaturizing the optical components required for quantum
state generation in the Alice device (Chapter 3).
• Increases to the security and maximum speed of photon detectors in the Bob
device (Chapter 4).
1.11 System
The system consists of two major components: A small and portable “Alice” mod-
ule and a larger, fixed “Bob” module, the internals of which will be discussed in
section 2.2. A principal advance from previous work on the system overall is these
components’ integration into a prototype system demonstrating the suitability for
the scenarios depicted in section 1.9.
The “Quantum ATM” shown in figure 1.25 consists of: a 4U 19inch rack mount-




the Alice devices; a TIA developed in-house at Bristol University by a fellow PhD
student, Richard Nock [79], an embedded PC system for data processing and a
Wifi router to manage the public channel connections. In order to allow for “plug
and play” operation, the front of the Quantum ATM also features a magnetic mount
allowing for instant repeatable optical alignment between the Alice and Bob devices.
The “user device” from figure 1.25 consists of: a personal digital assistant (PDA)
(although theoretically any pocket device is feasible) which communicates with the
Bob device and provides a front-end for the user to interact with; electronic unit
for random number generation and limited data processing and an optics unit to
generate the quantum states necessary to carry out QKD.
1.12 Summary
This chapter has:
• Introduced concepts of classical cryptography and the basis which historical
and modern methods use for security (section 1.2).
• Separately introduced two quantum phenomena important to cryptography;
section 1.3 discussed the possibility of a quantum computer being able to break
classical cryptography more efficiently than a regular computer and section 1.4
introduced the concept that an arbitrary quantum state cannot be copied since
a measurement of the state will disturb it.
• Extended the ideas from section 1.4 into section 1.5 into the concept of quan-
tum key distribution (QKD). A method of generating cryptographic keys
which is guaranteed secure by the laws of physics.




the protocol chosen for this project (BB84) to improve performance and secu-
rity. (Sections 1.5.2, 1.5.3, 1.5.3.1 respectively)
• Described analyses of QKD with imperfect devices whilst maintaining uncon-
ditional security (section 1.6).
• Provided an overview of various important free space QKD experiments which
have been useful to the development of this project (section 1.7.1). Section
1.7.2 then discusses the history of the Bristol system before this work com-
menced.
• Discussed various commercially available QKD systems in section 1.8 and then
in section 1.9 how this work would differ from such systems.
• And finally sections 1.10 and 1.11 describe the work undertaken in this thesis
and a brief description of the system as a whole which will be discussed in far
greater detail in chapter 2.
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The Bristol QKD System
This chapter consists of an introduction to the actual physical components of the
system (section 2.1), the theory of their operation and design considerations neces-
sary for combining them all into a quantum key distribution (QKD) system (section
2.2). Design and construction of the handheld Alice device and integrated Bob ter-
minal was performed during the first year of this PhD and this work culminated in
a demonstration at the “SECure COmmunication based on Quantum Cryptogra-
phy (SECOQC)” conference which is covered in section 2.3. The results obtained
for the system exhibited at the SECOQC conference are presented at the end of this
chapter.
2.1 System Components
Section 2.2 will provide detailed descriptions of the components in the Alice and
Bob devices, a brief introduction to these components is given below and their
interconnections depicted schematically in figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Block diagram of whole QKD system showing the Alice components in
pink and the Bob components in blue. The lines signify internally connected sys-
tems and the Quantum and Public channels (purple and green respectively) signify
the system connections outside of the devices. The roles of individual components
are mentioned in section 2.1.1 for Alice components and section 2.1.2 for the Bob
components.
2.1.1 The Alice Device
PDA This component is the interaction point of the system. A personal digital
assistant (PDA) is chosen due to its conformity to the design brief table 1.1
however any device with a USB interface can be utilized here.1.
RAM/QRNG These components are mentioned together since one of the two will
serve as the source of Alice’s random bits. For prototyping the same random
string can be loaded from random access memory (RAM) repeatedly; this is
clearly insecure but isolates the performance of the quantum random number
generator (QRNG) from the performance of the system.
FPGA The field programmable gate array (FPGA) is configured to generate some
1a laptop is often used for prototyping
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clock and select states to transmit based on bits loaded from the RAM or
QRNG on every clock cycle. It is the component the PDA instructs to start
and stop transmitting.
AND Gates and Pulse Shortening The signals from the FPGA are not suffi-
ciently short to produce photons with accurate enough timing resolution and
so a pulse shortening circuit is included. This shortened pulse is then routed
to one of the LEDs by way of AND gates. The process of pulse shortening will
be discussed in section 2.2.1.1 and is illustrated in figure 2.2.
Alice Optics Briefly, the Alice optics consist of four LEDs, each generating one of
the Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) polarization states. These are collimated
and filtered and sent down the quantum channel. More in depth discussion is
in section 2.2.1.
2.1.2 The Bob Device
Bob Optics The optics and various electronics for cooling and quenching the de-
tectors are situated in a light tight milled aluminium box on an xyz kinematic
mount to allow for alignment. The optics and such are discussed in much more
depth in section 2.2.2.
FPGA The FPGA in Bob is configured to operate as a 4 channel time interval
analyser (TIA) which applies a time tag to each detected pulse which is used
to reconcile the sparse list of detections Bob generates with the complete list
of transmitted states possessed by Alice.
PC A PC motherboard is situated inside the Bob device, the PC interfaces with the
FPGA TIA and processes the data along with the subset of Alice’s transmitted
bits that are sent. Performing all processing on the Bob device allows the Alice
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device to be as small as possible, conforming to the design brief (table 1.1)
Wireless Router Wifi is used as a public channel as it does not require line of sight
or any further alignment and there is mature and robust hardware and software
for interacting over wifi. For the sake of demonstrating the fact that the public
channel is untrusted the link is unsecured however this is not necessarily the
best option in a real implementation. System administration of the integrated
PC is also performed over the network connection.
2.2 Theory of Operation
2.2.1 Alice Optics
2.2.1.1 LED Sources
Single photons are the logical choice for “flying” quantum bits (qubits) in a Quantum
Information application; they are easy to produce, have long coherence times and
interact weakly with the environment whilst also being easily detectable [80]. Single
photons are generated by many physical processes such as Quantum Dots [81], Spon-
taneous Parametric Down Conversion [82, 83] and Colour Centres in Diamond [84].
It is however, acceptable to heavily attenuate a short pulsed source such as an LED
or a Laser providing the statistics are analysed correctly and chosen to minimize
signals containing greater than one photon [62]. This is the chosen method in this
QKD system since “true” single photon sources are not yet a mature technology and
tend to be large, expensive and/or delicate [44] whereas the technology for weakly
pulsing an LED or Laser Diode can be done using only basic electronics and neutral
density (ND) filters.
There are two options when producing the multiple states required for BB84
QKD, one is to use a single light source and choose the state by employing an
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Optical Modulator [85] to select between states, these can, however, be large and
expensive. A simpler approach is to use multiple light sources with relevant passive
optical elements, this removes the issues of size and cost however adds an extra level
of complexity in the requirement that each state must be indistinguishable aside
from the property the qubit is encoded in (in this case, polarization).
Another consideration is that in order to produce the short pulses required to
ensure a low photon number per pulse, the diodes must be driven with very short
electrical pulses, this becomes an issue for Laser Diodes which require a certain
threshold current in order to exhibit lasing behaviour, below this the Laser Diode
will only undergo spontaneous emission and will behave very similarly to an LED
thus invalidating many of its desirable characteristics (yet retaining many of its
undesirable ones!). It is possible to construct a current driver to supply sufficient
current however this adds further complexity and size to the system whereas an
LED can pulse acceptably even when driven with pulses from transistor-transistor
logic (TTL) or similar.
Whilst Laser Diodes have many superior qualities compared to light emitting
diodes (LEDs), such as narrower optical spectra and very low divergence angles,
LEDs are employed in this QKD system for reasons of size, cost and inherent inco-
herence. Due to the spectral width of the light emitted by LEDs, it is necessary to
employ narrow spectral filtering and a great deal of characterization to ensure that
no information is carried in the spectra of emitted light pulses.
There is a lower limit on the maximum repetition rate of an LED than of a Laser
Diode due to the the differing processes by which the light is produced. An LED is
limited by the spontaneous lifetime of the carriers in the LED (∼ns) whereas a Laser
Diode driven correctly is limited by the lifetime of the photons in the cavity(∼ps).
There does lie a potential to outperform the spontaneous lifetime of the LED by
using RCLEDs (Resonant Cavity LEDs) [86].
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In light of these considerations, a 2×2 grid of LEDs driven by short TTL signals
are utilized as photon sources, the pulse width is determined by changing the delay
imposed on the second input of the AND gate (figure 2.2), the pulse width Wp is
determined by the on time of the input signal Ton and the time delay τd by:
Wp = Ton − τd (2.1)
Figure 2.2: Method used to create short pulses to drive the LEDs in the Alice
system. A version of the input pulse width Ton is delayed by τd and recombined
with an undelayed version of the input pulse resulting in a shorter pulse of length
Ton − τd (see equation 2.1
A small piece of polarizing film2 is placed over each LED aligned in such a way
as to polarize the resultant light in each of the four polarizations states depicted in
figure 1.5.
2.2.1.2 Collimation Optics
In order to collimate the light from multiple sources, a 2D diffraction grating, hereby
referred to as a diffractive optical element (DOE) is employed to combine the light
2such as ThorLabs LPVISE2X2
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according to the equation [87]3:
nλ = dsinθn (2.2)
where d is the grating period, n is the diffraction order and θn is the angle of
diffraction of the nth order.
In the opposite arrangement than if one wished to create a diffraction pattern, the
sources are placed at the positions of the first maxima and are therefore combined
into a single beam (figure 2.3). It is then necessary to filter out extra diffraction
orders (since there are only light sources at the primary maxima) which can be
achieved using a pinhole positioned such that it only allows the central peak to
pass.
Figure 2.3: The arrangements of the Alice Optics. a) 4 LEDs are secured in a metal
housing, each with a polarizer glued across the front corresponding to a polariza-
tion required for performing BB84. b) The light from the LEDs is incident onto a
diffraction grating which combines the beams into one axial beam (and many higher
order terms). c), d) Two pinholes are placed after the diffraction grating to filter
out the extra modes from the diffraction grating and then to ensure that the light
leaving the final pinhole is transversely coherent. These components are mounted
in a 12.5mm optics tube (omitted for clarity).
3although this equation is for a 1 dimensional grating, a 2D grating can be considered two 1D
gratings placed at right angles
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2.2.1.3 Security Considerations
In order to avoid the photon number splitting (PNS) attack(section 1.5.3), the pho-
ton number must be chosen such that the count rate is maximised without emitting
too many multiphoton pulses. This has been taken into consideration in the security
proofs and is a case of calibrating the system to use an optimal µ. In addition to
this, aside from polarization, one must ensure that there is no other method for
distinguishing photons as this would mean that an Eavesdropper could determine
with certainty which polarization was sent.
Photon Number Calibration of the photon number is a surprisingly easy task, one
must simply couple a pulsed LED to a single photon avalanche diode (SPAD),
correct the count rate for the detector efficiency and then divide the count
rate by the frequency of the source.
As previously mentioned, the statistics of the source are assumed to be Pois-





where p(N, µ) is the probability the source will emit N photons in a pulse of
µ mean photon number.
One can say that the probability of a pulse containing a nonzero number of
photons is:
p (N ≥ 1) = 1− e−µ (2.4)
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where p (N ≥ 1) is the probability the source emits more than one photon (ie
something that will cause a SPAD to register a count). If the light source is
perfectly imaged onto a SPAD, for a sufficiently large data set:
p (N ≥ 1) → C/η
f
(2.5)
where C is the total detected counts, η is the detector efficiency and f is the
pulsing frequency. These equations can be combined to obtain an expression
for µ for a given count rate.
C
ηf







In a practical sense, the current can then be varied (using a series resistor) to
the LED until the required counts are present on the detector. The general
idea is to choose µ such that:
p (N ≥ 2) = 1− (1 + µ) e−µ (2.8)
is small enough that Eve’s information (she must be assumed to have full infor-
mation on these bits) can be totally removed in the process of reconciliation.
More specifically, the optimum value for µ can be found by expressing the
expected secret rate, R (from equation 1.54) in terms of µ, this equation
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depends on several other parameters of the apparatus and so the optimum µ
is different for each system4.
Spatial Information If Eve could simply look into the Alice device and see which
LED illuminated for each qubit, she could know with certainty Alice’s bit
string and therefore send on states to Bob which reflected this, thus gleaming
the entire key without alerting either party of her presence. This issue was
discussed in section 2.2.1.2 and if the grating and pinhole are selected and
positioned correctly, the issue is nullified.
Phase Information If each source emitted light with a characteristic phase, then
Eve could utilize some kind of eavesdropping device to measure the phase dif-
ference between qubits from Alice and extrapolate this to which light source
fired. As mentioned above, this is not an issue with LEDs as they emit inco-
herent light. It is discussed in [89] that while security can be maintained for a
phase coherent source, it is less secure than using a phase randomised source.
Spectral Information Due to the nature of LEDs, they have much wider spectra
than Laser Diodes, this presents the possible problem that Eve could measure
the wavelength of photons from Alice and discern which source the photon
came from therefore being able to forward this state on to Bob in the knowl-
edge that it was faithfully reproduced. A 3nm wide 632.8nm bandpass filter is
placed at the exit of Alice’s optical path and the power is varied such that the
mean photon number across the range of the filter is equal for each LED. An-
other identical filter at the entrance to Bob’s optical path is also implemented
although this is useful for reducing the detected background light level and
may have benefits in the susceptibility of the system to the back-flash attack
mentioned in section 1.5.3.
4as discussed in section 1.6.1, this is often close to the channel efficiency
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Coherence A critical assumption in the security proofs discussed in section 1.6 is
that each pulse from Alice is coherent (i.e. in a single mode; the statement does
not imply phase correlations between pulses, which are required to be random).
Light emitted from a laser is inherently coherent however the situation is more
complicated for a thermal source such as the LEDs used in this apparatus.
As discussed in [73] the longitudinal coherence (coherence time/length) of
LEDs is suitable however it is also necessary to consider the transverse coher-
ence properties, the area over which two parts of a beam are coherent with
each other. This situation can be visualised by placing a source in front of a
double slit and varying the slit separation. For a non point/plane source there
is a path difference at each slit introduced due to the non-negligible source size
which becomes more important with increasing slit separation until eventually
the interference effects stop entirely5. The expression for the coherence area







where θs is the angular size of the source from the point of view of the ob-
server/interference point and λ is the wavelength of the light.
Therefore a second pinhole must be employed in the collimating optics dis-
cussed in section 2.2.1.2. Treating the first (filter) pinhole as a source, and
using equation 2.9 one can find the diameter of the coherence area at a certain
point away from the first pinhole and employ a pinhole of this diameter to
filter out extra modes.
5this property is utilized in Michelson’s Stellar Interferometer where the light from a star is
diffracted by a double slit and the slit separation is varied until interference visibility disappears
from which one can infer the angular size of the star far beyond the Rayleigh limit
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2.2.2 Bob Optics
2.2.2.1 Beam Splitter Optics
Figure 2.4: Design of Bob Optics box, showing the optical components and the
optical path through the device. The light enters the collection lens and is split by
the non polarizing beamsplitter (50:50). One path is rotated by 45◦ by the half wave
plate (HWP) and each path is split according to its polarization onto detectors. The
beam splitters are placed on tip/tilt stages (green) to allow for adjustments to the
alignment.
The optics displayed in figure 2.4 are the standard BB84 polarization discrimina-
tion system, utilizing a 50:50 beam splitter which, when single photons are incident
upon it, randomly directs the photons along the transmission or reflection arms of
the experiment. To allow the optics to be coplanar, a λ
2
wave plate (HWP) is em-
ployed to rotate the polarization of the light in one arm, this is a far simpler prospect
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than mounting a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) at 45◦ to the horizontal. Each PBS
then performs the polarization measurement step, transmitting horizontally polar-
ized light and displacing vertically polarized light onto respective detector. The
input optical tube on the front of the box contains a two 50mm lenses to image the
pinhole on the front of the Alice device onto the detectors and a 3nm wide 632.8nm
bandpass filter.
Figure 2.5: Diagram of the imaging system used in Bob (certain elements omitted
for clarity). A 10mm diameter 50mm focal length lens focuses on the output pinhole
of the Alice device. This beam is then imaged onto the detectors by a second 10mm
diameter 50mm lens. The 300µm pinhole is imaged 1:1 onto the 500µm detector
area allowing for a certain amount of misalignment in the optical path.
Figure 2.5 shows how the pinhole at the front of Alice is imaged onto the detectors
in Bob, it is simplified (PBSs removed) for clarity. The optical path length between
the imaging lens and the detector is actually longer than 50mm since 35mm of that
path occurs in the beam splitters (The 50:50 beam splitters are made from BK7 and
the PBS Calcite) resulting in an elongation of the focal length. Utilizing the Optical
Path Length equation OPL = Ln [91] where L is the length and n the refractive
index. The optical path length of the whole system can be calculated and designed
appropriately.
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Substituting the dimensions of the components (L50:50 = 10mm, LPBS = 25mm,
nBK7 = 1.517, ncalcite,e = 1.486, ncalcite,o = 1.658), the total distance between lens
and detector surface of 63.33mm for the o-rays (transmitted) and 61.58mm for the
e-rays (reflected).
2.2.2.2 Detectors
The image in figure 2.6 shows the “reach through” design of Avalanche Photodiode
utilised in the Perkin Elmer C30902S APDs [92] which are used as photon detectors
in the Bob device. The area marked π is the “absorption region”where photons
generate electron-hole pairs, the electric field across this area separates the elec-
trons and the holes and moves the electron towards the “multiplication region”. In
the multiplication region, the electric field is much higher, this is to accelerate the
electron to cause it to create more electron-hole pairs via impact ionisation which
are accelerated in opposite directions, the holes can then cause further electron-hole
pairs further up the potential which causes a self sustaining avalanche breakdown
resulting in a high gain [93].
The diodes are reverse biased at 25V above the reverse breakdown voltage, VB.
The breakdown voltage is the point at which the avalanche breakdown process be-
comes self sustaining and the device is sensitive to single photons (a SPAD). The
value of 25V was chosen as the optimum for the device; the efficiency and tim-
ing resolution increase with voltage however so do the dark counts, dead time and
afterpulsing [95,96] which are undesirable qualities.
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Figure 2.6: Schematic of an APD reproduced from [94]. For SPAD operation,
photons enter from above, are absorbed in the p-doped π region and then highly
accelerated to create an avalanche of new electron-hole pairs in the high field region
on the p-n junction. The graph to the side of the schematic shows the electric field
through the depth of the device showing the field across the absorption region to
separate the photogenerated carriers and the relatively higher field across the pn
junction where the carriers are accelerated such to cause impact ionisation.
If the APD is reverse biased above breakdown, once it begins conducting (due
to a photon absorption or a thermal generation of an electron-hole pair) it would
continue to conduct and therefore be useless as a time correlated photodetector. If a
resistor is placed in series with the diode, as in figure 2.7, before the diode conducts
no current is flowing in the circuit so the voltage at A is the same as VR. When the
diode begins to conduct the current flowing through RL causes the voltage at A to
drop and the current to fall below ILatch, the current for which the avalanche is self
sustaining. A second resistor, RS is placed on the other side of the diode and causes
the voltage at B to be of the form of the diode current, a spike with an exponential
decay [97]. A comparator with an appropriately set threshold can be connected at
B (figure 2.8) to provide interface between this circuit and TTL electronics.
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Figure 2.7: The APD in a reverse biased circuit. The diode is reverse biased by
VR through a large load resistor RL and a small sensing resistor RS. The stray
capacitance RS is shown and the grey box corresponds to the diode equivalent
circuit described in [97] where Rd and Cd are the device resistance and capacitance
respectively and the voltage source VBr signifies the breakdown voltage. Points A
and B are referred to in the text in the discussion of the passive quenching behaviour.
Figure 2.8: A comparator is added at point “B” from figure 2.7, with an adequately
set comparison voltage (150mV here), this produces a TTL signal when an avalanche
occurs. For adequate quenching RL = 470kΩ and RS = 50Ω.
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2.2.3 Processing
2.2.3.1 TIA
Timing measurement of the photon arrivals is of paramount importance when at-
tempting to establish a shared secret between two parties, in this system it is
achieved by an FPGA based Time Interval Analyzer developed at Bristol Univer-
sity [79,98] which operates based on propagating an incoming pulse down a tapped
delay line and comparing each delay tap to the edge of a fast clock (figure 2.9). In
this way it is possible to determine the arrival time of a signal to sub-clock accuracy.
The FPGA then sends coarse time (clock number), fine time (tap number) and input
channel (0-3) via gigabit ethernet to a PC for post-processing.
The diagram in figure 2.9 shows a schematic of the TIA operation. Time tags
are generated by comparing variously delayed versions of an input pulse against
a clock signal. In this way the pulse can be identified by its coarse arrival time
and also the number of delays it had passed through giving a timing resolution
of the clock period divided by the number of delay taps. In reality the gates are
more complicated than this however the detailed description of this device is not
the purpose of this document and further information can be found in [79]. The
actual device has a clock speed of 225MHz and 146 delay taps allowing a coarse
time resolution of 4.4ns and a fine resolution of 30.5ps. Tests performed in [79] show
an RMS timing measurement error of ∼ 35.2ps.
2.2.3.2 Algorithms and Reconciliation
Once the data is accrued on the PC, since no clock is exchanged between the Alice
and Bob devices, the data must be analysed to discriminate between signal pulses
and noise pulses, this is done by “gating” the data. Gating is performed by Alice
sharing the clock rate but no other clock information, with this, an arbitrary clock
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Figure 2.9: A schematic to demonstrate the operation of the TIA utilized in the
system. The circles “chX” are the inputs; the blue boxes correspond to electronic
delays; the orange, AND gates and the green to information outputs. Refer to
section 2.2.3.1 for details of the operation.
can be simulated against which the time of arrival of all signals can be fitted (figure
2.10); anything not congruent (± some width ≈ the timing uncertainty) with the
gated data can be considered background noise.
Data is then shared with Alice as per 1.5.2.1 via a classical channel, in this case,
a wifi network, the errors are removed via the CASCADE error correcting protocol
and then a privacy amplification algorithm is run in order to minimize the knowledge
gained by Eve from errors in the system. More on these processes is discussed in
chapter 5.
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(a) Comparing the detection times with the clock. One detection is found congruent
with the clock.
(b) The clock times are shifted by ∆t. There are now four detections congruent with
the clock
Figure 2.10: The process of comparing the detection times with a variety of clock
delays to isolate the signal from the noise.
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2.3 SECOQC Demonstration System
The system inherited at the beginning of this project functioned correctly however
it consisted of two similarly sized devices aligned on an optical breadboard with
external connections to desktop PCs for all processing (figure 2.13(a)). This proved
principle for the idea of a consumer grade QKD system but did not really provide
practicality as discussed in table 1.1.
Aside from packaging the devices into suitable enclosures, the Bob optics were
redesigned to include simpler tuning of alignment and the issue of aligning the two
devices was solved by the use of a magnetic kinematic mount.
Following the events in this chapter, the system was largely dismantled due
to some damage incurred in transport. The opportunity was taken to isolate the
subsystems and improve them individually. For this reason the results are presented
separately from the system performance characterisation performed in chapter 5.
2.3.1 The Event
This project was demonstrated at the SECOQC Conference between 8-10th Oc-
tober 2008. This conference was the first demonstration of a working QKD net-
work [99] and featured a “Quantum-Back-Bone” network comprising of five nodes
(figure 2.11), four of which were in Vienna and one 85km distant in the nearby city
of St. Pölten. In all 7 different technologies were demonstrated :
• Auto-compensating Plug&Play [74]
• Coherent One Way [100]
• One Way Weak Pulse [101]
• Entangled Photons [102]
• Continuous Variables [103]
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• Last Mile Free Space QAN [104]
• Low Cost Secure Key Exchange (the subject of this thesis)
It is important for the widespread adoption of QKD that standards exist to allow
for the inter-operation of different devices and for simplicity of maintenance once
large networks are deployed. Rigorous standards also allow for stringent bounds
on system performance allowing peace of mind that security is guaranteed. In
order to realise this the SECure COmmunication based on Quantum Cryptogra-
phy (SECOQC) project, along with ETSI, the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute, formed the Quantum Industry Specification Group, QISG [105].
(a) A Map of the SECOQC Network (b) A Diagram of the SECOQC Network
Figure 2.11: The SECOQC Network in Vienna
2.3.2 System
Previous to the demonstration in the SECOQC project, the physical system was
developed on a large optical bench with a separate PC both sides for the classical
processing [72] (figure 2.13(a)). This was sufficient for demonstrating the quantum
channel link however once this was proved viable it was necessary to develop the
points discussed in table 1.1 such that the model of a trivially replaceable Alice mod-
ule could be demonstrated. The system devised for use is schematically displayed
in figure 2.12 and a photograph is shown in figure 2.13(b).
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Figure 2.12: The components included in the QKD Terminal device demonstrated
at SECOQC Conference
In order to demonstrate the possibility of developing a hand held Alice device,
a circuit was developed with drive electronics and was controlled using a PDA (HP
iPAQ) via serial expansion card. Clearly this is not a practical system for a pro-
duction device however many of the components used on the drive electronics are
duplicated in modern mobile devices and this application could be incorporated into
their design at a far lower level. The electronics were placed into an aluminium box
fitted with 12.5mm optics tube containing the LEDs, DOE and pinholes.
The rest of the device is referred to as “The Bob Terminal” and consists of a
4U 19-in rack steel casing (the dark grey curved edged rectangle in figure 2.12) with
a platform bolted to the front (light grey rectangle) for the Alice mechanism. A
photograph is displayed in figure 2.13(b)
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(a) Old System (Optics only) showing Alice,
left and Bob, right.
(b) SECOQC Demonstration Apparatus
(Bob only, Alice removed so magnetic mount
is visible)
Figure 2.13: A Comparison between the system as of the 2006 publication [72] and
the SECOQC Demonstration
For Alice alignment, a magnetic kinematic mount base (Newport Optics BK-2A)
was bolted to a tip/tilt stage (Thorlabs APY001) for two of the degrees of freedom
of alignment required to get best coupling of light from Alice to Bob. The magnetic
mount allows better than 100microradians pointing accuracy [106] for repeated re-
placement onto the mount, corresponding with a ±15µm error on the position of the
spot image on the detector. Since a 300µm pinhole is being imaged onto a 500µm
detector active area, this ensures adequate alignment and no significant decrease in
coupling is expected with repeated placements.
The Bob optics box is mounted on a 3 axis (XYZ) translation stage (Newport
Optics ULTRAlign 562) bolted to the bottom of the case providing the remaining
degrees of freedom (aside from rotation) required for alignment.
The TTL output from the comparators in the detector circuit in section 2.2.2.2
is fed directly via SMA Coaxial cables into the four inputs on the FPGA TIA
board. The TIA is connected via two separate connections to the PC: serial, for
control and gigabit ethernet, for data. The PC is a “headless” mini-itx motherboard.
Communication is made with this device over secure shell (SSH) or virtual network
computing (VNC) via the router, either over the wifi network or through an ethernet
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port situated on the rear of the case.
Unsecured wifi was chosen for the public channel as it is a mature and increas-
ingly ubiquitous technology with high bandwidth and is easily “hackable” in that
it inherently proves the quantumness of the key distribution as any arbitrary eaves-
dropper could be invited to utilize one of many available packet sniffing techniques
to intercept the classical communication in full [107, 108]. In practice any other
classical communication protocol could be chosen (bluetooth, radio, IR) to fit later
device specifications.
2.3.3 Results
In order to characterise the system, the extinction ratios of the detectors need to be
determined. The extinction ratio is defined by the proportion of light sent in one
state (say, 0) and detected in the opposite (in this case, 1). If the count rates on each
detector are plotted for each LED illumination, each row and column should have
one element containing 50% of the counts, two containing 25% of the counts (these
correlate to the opposing basis) and one element containing 0%. This, of course is
not the case, and the proportion of counts in the 0% element to the total counts in
the basis is called the extinction ratio. The data taken in the Vienna System are
shown in figure 2.14.
The repeatability of the magnetic mount operation was then tested by repeatedly
replacing the Alice device into the magnetic cradle and measuring the count rate and
average extinction ratio; this data is displayed in figure 2.15 and shows that there
is no significant down shift to misalignment. More rigorous testing of this method
has been performed since the SECOQC conference and is presented in chapter 5.
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(a)







Figure 2.14: (a)Matrix of count rates across all 4 detectors for each LED illuminated.
The bars corresponding to the non signal basis are dimmed out for clarity. (b) a
table of the extinction ratios, the proportion of opposite signals detected for a given
transmitted bit
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Figure 2.15: The Alice device was repeatedly re-docked on the magnetic mount and
the total counts and Polarization Extinction Ratio in the “1B” basis were measured.
Raw key was generated with a range of different background light levels. A graph
of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the raw key and corresponding secret rate
are shown in figure 2.16. A background rate of 40-45kCounts/Sec was measured
in an indoor windowed room in daytime verifying that the system would produce
an estimated rate of 10kBits/Sec of secret key in general daylight operation. The




Mean Photon Number 0.3
Transmission Time 4 seconds
Gate Width 5ns
Table 2.1: Key parameters of the system used in the SECOQC demonstration.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.16: QBER (a), and corresponding key rate (b) for varying levels of back-
ground for system demonstrated in SECOQC conference. The key rate was calcu-
lated using the GLLP [62] proof which was discussed in section 1.6.1
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• Provided a description of the Bristol Low Cost Short Range QKD system.
• Discussed theory behind some of the design aspects of the system.
• Addressed security considerations of the components used.
• Given a summary of the SECOQC conference and the performance of the
system as of that time. This was the culmination of the first year of this PhD.
• Shown key generation of ≈ 10kB/sec in indoor daylight with a magnetic dock-




The Alice device consists of the optics necessary to create photons in the four polar-
ization states necessary for Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) and relevant electronics
for converting a random string into driving pulses for the optics. The optics com-
prise a 2x2 array of red LEDs with a polarizing film placed over each of them. The
light from the LEDs is combined using a 2D diffraction grating and then spatially
filtered using pinholes. A field programmable gate array (FPGA) is used for control
and to interface with some further device (PDA, laptop, mobile phone).
The work undertaken in this chapter focuses on research into methods for de-
creasing the physical size of the optics module by concentrating on the processes of
producing polarized light and of collimating the separate sources into one.
Figure 3.1(a) shows the current state of the Alice device, as it stands it is clearly
unsuitable for consumer applications, it is large and somewhat expensive. This is
not cause for concern however, figure 3.1(b)1 shows a picture of a prototype iphone
from approximately 2005, it measured 5x7x9 inches, clearly not suitable for usage
as a mobile phone. The relevance of this is that it is not unreasonable to expect
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(a) The Alice device (b) Early iPhone prototype
Figure 3.1: Comparison of the current Alice device to a recently unearthed picture
of an iPhone development prototype.
then the degree of miniaturization that got figure 3.1(b) to a genuinely pocket size
device could be achieved with the device in figure 3.1(a)
Figure 3.2 shows an idea of what a low cost device might look like, this is in no
way a fixed goal however it is useful to consider in order to give direction to the
research into improving the system. Another similar idea for a final product would
be to produce an off-the-shelf integrated circuit (IC) which would be able to be put
into any generic device for quantum key distribution (QKD) in a similar manner
to how near field communication (NFC) chips are becoming commonplace in smart
phones.
The goal of a credit card style device shown in figure 3.2, the IC idea mentioned
above and the mobile phone/personal digital assistant (PDA) type device shown
in figure 1.25 all have sufficient in common at the moment to derive some general
directions for research to progress in.
In addition to the device centric requirements, there are general requirements
such that the transmission speed should be as fast as possible and not compromise
the security of QKD and probably most importantly that it is as convenient to use as
the current security methods it seeks to replace (for now we will consider PINSentry,
referred to in 1.9.1).
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Figure 3.2: Artist impression of a possible final Alice device wherein the components
are minimized to the degree that they could fit into a credit card style device.
This chapter will introduce some ideas which will allow for greater miniaturiza-
tion or faster transmission and will begin to investigate how to enact those ideas.
3.1 Ideas
3.1.1 Remove need for diffractive optical element (DOE)
The use of a diffraction grating to combine the light from Alice is fundamentally a
good one, due to the high amplitude first order diffraction terms of a grating there
can be high throughput and good indistinguishability. One drawback however is
that as well as the x,y alignment between the centre of the grating and the LEDs,
rotation is of concern as the diffraction peaks are points and a rotation could lead
to a greatly decreased transmission as the peak is moved from the LED.
A far simpler idea is to use a pinhole to combine the light [109], a pinhole has
infinite rotational symmetry so there is no angular dependence on the diffraction and
alignment is greatly simplified. It is necessary to analyse both systems to determine
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whether the decreased transmissivity of a pinhole based beam combiner is within
acceptable bounds or not.
(a) Diffraction from a grating
(b) Diffraction from a pinhole
Figure 3.3: Comparison between the 1D diffraction from (a): a grating and (b): a
pinhole. The dotted red line in (a) is the single slit “envelope” resulting from the
number of slits illuminated being finite.
Figure 3.3 compares the diffraction patterns for a grating and a slit, the dimen-
sions of the grating are those of the grating currently used in the Alice collimator
optics (750 2µm slits, 4µm separation) and a pinhole that produces a first maxi-
mum at a similar angle (5.5µm). It is clear that the grating produces a much higher
and narrower first maximum than the slit, the area under the first maxima for each
pattern was calculated and is displayed in table 3.1.
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Proportion of light in the first maxima Percentage
Diffraction Grating 39.14%
Single Slit 4.81%
Table 3.1: Percentage of light contained within first diffraction peak of Single Slit
and Grating
To rigorously analyse the optical arrangements, it will be first necessary to define
some measurements in the system and then some measures of quality. The mea-
surements are shown in figure 3.4, as well as this, a quantity henceforth known as
the “lumped efficiency” or ǫ will be defined as the proportion of light emitted by an
LED which will exit the second pinhole.
Figure 3.4: Schematic of the simplified system wherein a pinhole is used to collimate
several beams of light.
For a given first pinhole size, a, it is first necessary to calculate where the diffrac-




















Once the angle of the first maxima is determined, application of trigonometry
can be used to determine the LED-Pinhole separation, x for a given LED pitch
and pinhole diameter. The transmitted light from pinhole A is then required to be
spatially filtered to block out all non axial modes. This can be done by determining
the angular width of the first maxima of the diffracted light from Pinhole A and
placing a further pinhole, B in a position such that any light transmitted outside of
the cone defined by the first minima is blocked.
From figure 3.5(a) it can be seen that even for very small (sub millimetre) scale
pinholes and LED pitch values, the LED-Pinhole separation can still be very large.
Since in table 1.1 we established that size is of great importance to the specifications
of the system, it is therefore necessary to choose pinholes and LED pitches as small
as is practical to reduce the length as much as possible.
It is necessary, however, to consider the impact that the choices made in light of
figure 3.5(a) with regards to the lumped efficiency of the optics. As can be seen in
figure 3.5(b), the pinhole diameter has negligible effect compared to the LED Pitch
which should be selected as small as possible. The effects of significantly lowering
the lumped efficiency are discussed in section 3.1.3.
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(a) LED Pinhole Separation for Various LED array pitch and pinhole
values.
(b) Throughput of the Pinhole system for various pinhole diameters
and LED array pitches.
Figure 3.5: Characterisation of the Pinhole collimating scheme simulated with a
FWHM LED emission angle of 25◦. Note how the lumped efficiency (throughput)
depends only very weakly on the pinhole diameter. A far more important quantity
in the design is the LED array pitch which should be as small as possible to minimize
the physical size of the whole system and maximize the throughput.
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3.1.2 Diffractive Overlap
A further possibility, which would be possible only with very small LED pitches
(∼100µm), is to utilize an arrangement wherein the zeroth maxima from each LED
being diffracted through the pinhole have a certain degree of overlap (figure 3.6(b)),
in a similar manner to the previous system a secondary pinhole could be employed to
spatially filter light in non-overlapping regions. Felicitous choice of pinhole diameters
can lead to higher lumped efficiencies than in the previously described method which
can be seen from comparing figure 3.5(b) with figure 3.7.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.6: Diagram of the principle behind collimating the zeroth diffracted peaks
from a pinhole.(a) demonstrating the diffraction angles defined for the simulation
parameters and (b) shows how a second pinhole filters only for the overlapping
region. (Colour is used to clarify the mixing of light from LEDs rather than any
kind of spectral information)
To investigate the effect of pinhole diameter and LED pitch on the lump efficien-
cies, a simulation was performed, again utilizing the Fraunhofer diffraction equation
(equation 3.1) and analysing how much of the light incident at an angle θ1 crosses
the pinhole axis (figure 3.6(a)), represented by the angle θ2. Due to the symmetry
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of the system the overlap segment can then be defined as the angles between θ2 and
−θ2 from the pinhole axis or θ2 + θ1 and θ2 − θ1 from the LED axis.
Figure 3.7: Efficiency of the diffractive overlap system for various parameters of the
arrangement.
The proportion of the light in this segment of the diffraction pattern compared





throughput of the system. Combining this with the amount of the LED emission
(estimated as Gaussian with a 30◦ FWHM) collected by the diffraction pinhole in
the first place gives the lump efficiency which was calculated for a range of pinhole
diameters over a range of LED pitches (figure 3.7)
The curves in figure 3.7 show an optimum value for pinhole diameter for a given
LED pitch, this is due to larger pinholes diffracting less (smaller overlap areas) but
allowing more light to pass through them. The trend for higher lump efficiencies
with smaller LED pitch can be clearly understood since this is a reduction in θ1.
Comparing this data to the data in figure 3.5(b), the same trend for increasing
efficiency at smaller pitch can be seen although the absolute values for the overlap
method are higher if the dimensions are chosen correctly. In light of this it is this
system which will be further analysed in the following section.
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3.1.2.1 Coherence
As per section 2.2.1.3, a further pinhole is now necessary to restrict the light to
a single mode. Unfortunately, this will reduce the lump efficiency even further
by introducing a further filtering step. All is not lost, however since there is a
second pinhole present anyway its size can simply be reduced if it is bigger than the








dc can be converted to a “coherence half angle” θC by simple trigonometry once
an appropriate pinhole-pinhole distance is chosen. Assuming θC is smaller than
θ2, a pinhole of diameter dc can then be placed to ensure single mode output of the
arrangement. Since θC is independent of LED pitch, a graph of first pinhole diameter
vs dc is shown in figure 3.8 and the consequent reduction in lump efficiency is graphed
in figure 3.9.
Figure 3.8: Second pinhole diameter (equal to the coherence area) for varying values
of First Pinhole diameter at an example fixed distance of 10mm.
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Figure 3.9: Same simulation as figure 3.7 but for a choice of Second Pinhole which
is smaller than the coherence area, ensuring single mode operation. Note the scale
is the same as figure 3.7 which highlights the drop in throughput.
3.1.3 Collimators Summary
It should be noted here that although the lumped efficiencies discussed in this section
are very low (< 1%) this should not matter. A sample LED (HLMA-QH00 [110])
was measured to have a maximum CW output power of 1.32±0.01mW . Pessimisti-
cally bounding the pulse width at 1ns, at 10MHz gives 99% attenuation in pulsed
mode and a further 1% attenuation from the lump efficiency yields 1.32 × 10−7W .
Comparing this to the required power which is calculated by multiplying the single
photon energy = hc
λ
with the average photon number per pulse (0.1) and the repeti-
tion rate (10MHz) which is 3.14× 10−13W means that the 1% throughput is clearly
acceptable as long as sufficient current is supplied to the LED.
The optical arrangement presented in section 3.1.2 is recommended to be utilized
in the next generation Alice device if sufficiently small LEDs on a sufficiently close
pitch can be obtained and an effective way of mounting polarizers to these is found.
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3.2 Micro Polarizers
Currently, the polarization states necessary for BB84 are generated by separate
LEDs each with polarizing film placed over them in the required alignments. This
is practical for LEDs of large size (∼1mm) however the practicality of aligning
polarizing film to sub millimetre scale devices is challenging and a more advanced
technique is necessary.
Visible optical polarizers, such as the film mentioned above, are generally made
from micro or nano scale particles upon a film or glass substrate. Typical materials
are crystals of iodoquinine sulfate [111] or metal nanoparticles [112]. A practice
that has been used extensively for longer wavelengths [113, 114] is that of the wire
grid polarizer (WGP). The WGP works by presenting an array of parallel wires
perpendicular to an electromagnetic wave (figure 3.10). The components of the
electric field of this wave that are parallel to these wires couple strongly to the
electrons in the wire resulting in absorption or reflection. The electrons excited by
the components of the E field perpendicular to the wires are not so free to move and
the wave passes through the grid.
The criteria for a WGP to be effective in polarizing the light is that the grid
pitch and wire width (b and d in figure 3.11 respectively) must both be significantly
smaller than the wavelength of the light in question [115]. For the case of this QKD
experiment, the light is of wavelength 633nm. Recent advances in nanofabrication
have made it a viable possibility to experiment with wire grid polarizers for visible
wavelengths. As can be seen in [116], the polarization extinction ratio (PER)(see
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Figure 3.10: A Wire Grid Polarizer and how it interacts with the E field of an EM
wave. E waves parallel to the wires induce currents along the length the wires which
dissipates the energy of the waves; E waves perpendicular to the wires the induced
currents are across the width of the wires which provides less freedom for electrons
to move thus dissipating less energy.
where PTE and PTM are the power transmitted in TE and TM respectively.
Figure 3.11: The quantities varied during modelling. Not shown is a, the “fill ratio”
defined as b
d
As a proof of concept, FDTD simulation was performed on a range of subwave-
length gratings the results being shown in figure 3.12. Figure 3.12(a) shows how the
PER, varies with the grating pitch for a variety of metal thicknesses. This shows
that a thicker wire will produce better PER, which is expected due to the the higher
chance of absorption of light polarized parallel to the wires. This simulation also
indicates that the optimal pitch for 633nm light is 80nm, this is below the minimum
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resolution of our fabrication ability and as such the pitch which was selected to be
the smallest pitch available.
In addition to resolution related barriers for the fabrication, there is something of
a practical limit on the metal thickness since it is challenging to carve deep, narrow
trenches using focussed ion beam (FIB). For simplicity it was decided that the metal
thickness should be comparable to the grating pitch.
Figure 3.12(b) shows how the fill ratio affects the PER. The fill ratio is relative
width of a wire compared to the wire spacing. An optimum value was found at 0.7
which agrees with the optimal region found in [117].
(a) (b)
Figure 3.12: Results of FDTD simulation of the gratings plotting PER (a): against
d for varying h with a=0.5 and (b): against a with h=140nm, d=100nm.
Gratings were then manufactured by FIB etching trenches into a 200nm gold
film on a glass substrate. An image of an example grating is shown in figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.13: FIB (a)(b)(c) and SEM (d) Images of a FIB etched polarizer with the
parameters shown on (c)
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3.2.1 Polarization Measurement Apparatus
An apparatus was constructed to measure the PER of the gratings, this is displayed
in figure 3.14. The principle is that a laser beam is polarized and focused down to
a diffraction limited spot on the grating, the transmitted light is then collected into
a power meter. Rotation of a λ
2
waveplate (HWP) before the sample rotates the
incident polarization and the relationship between the polarization angle and the
transmittance of the grating is measured. Many gratings were etched onto a sample
and these were found by illuminating with a diffuse white light via a flip mirror
(FM) and using a 92:8 beam splitter (to reduce the power loss of the transmitted
laser beam) imaged onto a camera. Sample images from the apparatus can be seen
in figure 3.16.
Figure 3.14: Schematic of the apparatus used to measure the PER of gratings.
Abbreviations used are HWP: Half Wave Plate and FM: Flip Mirror. Beam cleaning
consists of an anamorphic prism pair to render the elliptical beam into a circular
beam and then a beam expander with a pinhole to spatially filter the beam to a
Gaussian and expand it to fill the back aperture of the focusing lens.
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In order to ensure that as little stray light was measured as possible, it was














the NA 0.62 lens yields a diffraction limit of 622.8nm for 633nm light.
A set of gratings of d = h = 100nm with varying values of a was fabricated and
the results are shown in figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15: Measured PER with varying values of metal fill ratio
Significant difficulty was found etching narrow, deep gratings which degraded
the measured polarizing effect over a wide range of grating parameters. The shape
of the graph in figure 3.15 is similar to the simulation from figure 3.12(b) albeit with
the reduced peak of just below 7:1 moved from a = 0.7 to a = 0.76. It is thought
this degradation is due to light leaking through the gold film which was thinned
during the etching process and the grating not having an exactly square profile.
99
CHAPTER 3. THE ALICE DEVICE
3.2. MICRO POLARIZERS
(a) (b)
Figure 3.16: Sample Images from the Polarizer/Plasmon measuring apparatus. (a)
shows 5µm wide alignment structures used for finding the structures. (b) shows two
nanoholes. The central, red spot is the focus of the laser which was aligned such
that it was fixed in the centre of the image.
3.2.2 Polarizers Summary
The process of etching nanoscale wire grid polarizers shows promise and should be
pursued further from these proof-of-principle experiments. Clearly however in its
current state this technology is not sufficiently mature for integration into the QKD
system of this thesis.
One possible improvement would be to change the metal used for the wires
to something with a higher absorption coefficient at the wavelength in question





where λ is the photon wavelength and κ is the extinction coefficient, which is the
imaginary part of the refractive index of the material. χ is also defined such that
1/χ is the distance into the material where the energy density has fallen to 1/e of
its initial value [119].
100
CHAPTER 3. THE ALICE DEVICE
3.2. MICRO POLARIZERS
Some values of χ for various different metals at 2eV (619.9nm)2 are given in
table 3.2 which show that the extinction coefficient for Aluminium is higher than
that of Gold which was used in this investigation and Silver which was unsuccessfully
attempted.








Table 3.2: Extinction and Absorption Coefficients for various metals at 619.9nm.
Values from [120]
3.2.3 Plasmonic Gratings
In addition to the FIB etched polarizers, an investigation into annular gratings was
performed using a modification on the apparatus in figure 3.14 (modified diagram
in figure 3.17). The principle behind the annular gratings is that they can couple
light efficiently into surface plasmons (electronic excitations) on a metal substrate
and then, providing the dimensions are chosen correctly, interfere constructively
and couple back into photons in a central hole. The extraordinary transmission via
plasmon excitation was first observed in hole arrays [121] and slits [122] however it
is also possible in a circularly symmetrical system [123,124] which is more useful for
point source applications.
The measurement apparatus was a modified version of that depicted in figure
3.14 with the following modifications: The white light source fiber was replaced
with 4.3µm core single mode fiber (SMF); the fiber collimating lens changed from
2closest available value to 633nm
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Figure 3.17: Schematic of the apparatus used to measure the spectral dependence
of the optical transmission of Plasmonic gratings. Details described in figure 3.14,
modifications to that figure discussed in the text.
11mm focal length, NA 0.25 to 4.43mm focal length, NA 0.56; the collection lens
changed from 5x microscope objective to 10x microscope objective; the redundant λ
2
plate removed; single photon avalanche diode (SPAD) module (for low light power
measurements) and Spectrometer used for measurements.
These modifications were made so that the white light spot size on the sample
was of the order of the size of the nanogratings, this was calculated by determining





giving dspot = 17.86µm of single mode light. Single mode light is necessary since
plasmon interference is required at the nanohole so coherent excitation is required.
The expected result was to see an enhancement of the transmission of light
at a wavelength of half the grating period, this was not observed possibly due to
damage while imaging using the single beam FIB or due to the low resolution of the
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spectrometer. Further information on this study can be found in the Masters thesis
of Lifeng Chen [125], the student for whom the apparatus was modified.
3.3 Summary
This chapter has introduced two ideas which will make a miniaturized Alice QKD
device more viable.
• Micro polarizers to allow for much smaller LED sizes.
• Simpler beam combining requiring one less degree of freedom in alignment.
In addition to this an apparatus was devised to analyse polarizing effects of
microstructures. This apparatus was also modified to analyse extraordinary trans-
mission through small holes surrounded by annular gratings due to plasmonic contri-
butions. The modifications were carried out by the author however the investigation
was not hence it has not been covered in this thesis.
The work was carried out into developing micro polarizers has proved promising
however the devices are not yet useful for integration into the QKD system as a
whole.
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The Bob terminal comprises apparatus for the discrimination and detection of the
polarized photons transmitted from the Alice device, the time tagging of these de-
tections and the offline processing of the tag data to synchronise and generate key.
The terminal also contains the means for an unsecured public channel to be estab-
lished between Alice and Bob (wifi or ethernet). These components are described
in more detail in section 2.1.2 and section 2.2.2.
Externally the terminal has a protruding shelf with a magnetic kinematic mount
for repeatable realignment of the Alice device to the Bob optics. Initially this process
was going to take place with a hand-held Alice device utilizing a second optical
path along which a (spatial) alignment pattern was displayed, key would only be
generated when the alignment pattern fell within a designated sensor area on the
Bob device. For now the magnetic dock is sufficient to display the possibility of an
instantly dockable device without the added complexity of the active alignment.
Figure 4.1 shows the current state of the Bob Terminal. This box contains all
of the blue elements from the image at the beginning of chapter 2 (figure 2.1). Also
visible is the shelf on the front containing the magnetic mount used for docking the
Alice device to the system. This device has not changed superficially since chapter
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Figure 4.1: The Bob Terminal
2 and will probably not change until the Alice device requires a change in mounting
method. That said, internally there are many improvements that can be carried out
to improve the performance of the system, this chapter will deal with some of them.
4.1 Requirements
For the system described in chapter 2 to be commercially viable, the speed of key
generation needs to be increased and the system must be checked for conformity in
light of new security proofs and attacks such as [48, 67]. Speed has been partially
and indirectly addressed earlier in that the smaller LED arrays mentioned in chapter
3 will have a lower capacitance [126] and therefore will be able to be driven at higher
rates and with shorter pulses [127], as a partner to the transmission speed increase,
an upgrading of the ability of the detectors to detect fast signals accurately and
efficiently is necessary.
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With the dead time of the detectors as it is (∼ 3µs), operating at 10MHz, a signifi-
cant proportion of photons are lost while the detector is recharging (60 clocks/dead
time). In fact, the situation is even worse when one considers “blinding”; whether
malicious or not, due to the assumptions made in section 1.5; that is, that if a detec-
tor detects a signal while another detector is recharging, it must be discarded since
there was a bias present in the detection probabilities which could be a manifestation
of an eavesdropping attempt. [41]
A simple countermeasure is merely to make the recharge time very small such
that there is a low probability that there will be another detection in the period
when there is bias in the detectors. Whilst one might näıvely think that since dead
time τD decreases for decreasing values of load resistor RL then one could pick
an arbitrarily small RL and the dead time would decrease consequently. However,
since the current through the single photon avalanche diode (SPAD) must be below a
threshold current ILATCH , specific to the device, for spontaneous quenching to occur,
a resistor which does not limit the avalanche current sufficiently will either lead to
an increased, erratic dead time as statistical fluctuations are required to quench the
avalanche or, worse, a reduction in current due to the increased resistance of the
SPAD heating, a situation that could lead to catastrophic failure of the device [128].
What is necessary then, is some sort of active solution to quenching which detects
the onset of an avalanche and reacts with some pulse to quench the avalanche and
allow rapid recharging through a small RL [97]. As can be seen by comparing the
passive circuit depicted in figure 2.8 to the proposed circuit in figure 4.2 that it can
be a relatively simple modification.
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Figure 4.2: Simplified diagram of Active Quenching a SPAD, described in section
4.2.1.
The manner by which the active circuit in figure 4.2 quenches the pulse is sim-
ply by allowing the SPAD to breakdown sufficiently to trigger a comparator and
then using the comparator output to trigger a Quenching Voltage VQ such that
VQ > VR − VB (where VR and VB, which were discussed in section 2.2.2.2 are the
reverse bias voltage and avalanche photodiode (APD) reverse breakdown voltage,
respectively) which stops the avalanche by reducing the voltage across the SPAD to
lower than its breakdown voltage. After a given time, to allow all carriers in the
junction to dissipate, the VQ is removed and the SPAD charges through RL and is
ready to detect again.
4.2.2 Active Recharge
Noting that recharge time is dependent on the RC of the charging circuit made up
from the resistive load that causes the quench and the capacitive contributions from
the SPAD junction capacitance and the quenching circuit stray capacitance (both of
the order of pF) a further modification can be performed which, upon the removal of
the quenching voltage, bypasses RL and connects the low side of the SPAD directly
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to ground resulting in a very rapid charge since the only resistive contribution to
RC then comes from the internal resistance of the diode. It is important to choose
the duration of this connection conservatively since a breakdown during this period
could cause undesired behaviour. The combination of active quenching and an active
recharge/reset is referred to as an AQAR configuration. This feature is schematically
shown in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: An Active Quench Active Reset circuit, described in section 4.2.2.
4.2.3 Active Holdoff
An issue with free-running detection schemes is that after a detection in a basis,
the detection efficiency of the two states within the basis are unbalanced (ideally
for a perfect AQAR system this goes from 50:50 to 100:0 and back again during
one dead time, for passive quenching it is a continuous change). Regardless of the
quench/recharge form any detection in this window could leak information to the
eavesdropper since she can be assumed to have full access to the public discussion and
therefore the timing information. This is even more problematic when one considers
that these invalid bits could “pile up” and for any given train of detections where
there is less than one whole dead time between any two bits only one sifted bit is
extractable, for increasing transmission rate this causes the secret bit rate to tend
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towards zero. This issue is discussed in [129] which parameterises the effect and





where p is the probability a sifted bit is detected per transmission rate clock
and τ is the detector dead time. And further arguments as to limitations and
security are made in [130] A far more simple and effective approach is to enact a
hardware implementation, disabling all detectors for τ after a detection is made on
any detector [131]. A modification to figure 4.3 for a two detector system is shown
in (figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Modification to the Active Quenching to allow for an Active Holdoff
A Monte-Carlo simulation was performed wherein two detectors were simulated
and were given realistic chances of triggering per clock (µ of 0.3 and Bob efficiency
of 30%) and a counter was implemented to monitor dead time. If a click occurred
for one detector, it was only recorded if the counter indicated both detectors were
active. Otherwise it was discarded and the counter reset. To simulate the Active
110
CHAPTER 4. THE BOB TERMINAL
4.2. IDEAS
Holdoff the behaviour was modified such that when a click occurred while a detector
was dead, it was still discarded however the counter was not reset (since the opposite
detector would be quenched also).
Figure 4.5: Usable count rates of a two detector system for varying dead times when
the active holdoff is disengaged (solid lines) and engaged (dotted lines).
As can be seen from figure 4.5, for a non-holdoff system (solid lines), there is a
peak repetition rate for a given dead time which corresponds to when the “pile up” of
detections overlapping the dead times of previous detections becomes dominant and
the rate eventially decreases to zero. The dotted lines show that when the detectors
are all disabled when a click occurs in either, the count rate does not peak, rather
it tends towards 1/τD (the inverse of the detector dead time) as the repetition rate
is increased.
Comparing the two data sets in figure 4.5 the benefit of Active Holdoff can be
quantified as the percentage increase of counts when Active Holdoff is enacted versus
the situation where it is not. Figure 4.6 shows that Active Holdoff at τD < 1/fT
where fT is the transmission frequency has a fairly marginal benefit but as the dead
time increases the Active Holdoff can detect usable counts long after the standard
system has become saturated. This improvement is demonstrated in figure 4.7 as the
percentage improvement of the count rate for various transmission rates at various
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Figure 4.6: Simulation of a system running at 10MHz with varying detector dead
times with Active Quenching, to demonstrate the benefit of Active Holdoff
detector dead times, it illustrates the point that the advantage of active holdoff is
mainly when the repetition rate of the source is shorter than the dead time and that
before this point the active holdoff scheme has no effect.
4.2.4 Cooling
The SPADs are mounted on two stage thermoelectric coolers to reduce the dark
count rate [132]. These are single voltage devices and must be driven carefully
to maintain a constant temperature since the APD breakdown voltage varies with
temperature, which would effect the efficiency and timing characteristics of the de-
tectors. As such a thermistor is present in the package to monitor temperature, an
appropriate circuit can monitor this thermistor and modulate the cooling accord-
ingly. In the system depicted in chapter 2 the monitoring was performed by a PIC
microcontroller measuring the resistance of the thermistor and switching cooling
transistors when the temperature was over a threshold (figure 4.8).
This system was flawed, due to the inability to effectively tune the threshold
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Figure 4.7: Simulation to quantify the increase in usable counts for a variety of
system specifications. A lower range of dead times is used here compared to figure
4.6 due to the fact that above this some of the higher transmission frequencies were
totally saturating the detectors and leading to excessively high percentage increases
(since the non active situation was only detecting one count)
and the requirement for two separate supply voltages (5V for logic and 3V for
the coolers), this also added bulk to the system as the grounds were isolated using
optoisolators. The PIC software was also undocumented and the author unreachable
so a decision was made to implement a far simpler system.
The circuit shown in figure 4.9 places the thermistor into a potential divider
with the output voltage connected to a comparator, the comparison voltage is then
supplied by a second, fixed potential divider. A variable resistor, RV was placed into
the reference potential divider circuit to allow for simple setting of the comparison
and therefore threshold temperature. The comparator output was then connected
to a MOSFET which, when closed completes the cooling circuit and begins to cool
the SPAD. A DCDC converter (LDO03C) was used such that the whole system
could be powered from a single 5V supply, this also reduced the current draw from
a power supply to below 2A.
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Figure 4.8: The old cooling circuit. A PIC microcontroller was utilized to monitor
the thermistor current, switching the peltier coolers appropriately. Optical isolators
were used to separate the two supply voltages (5V for logic, 3V for peltier coolers)
The data sheet for the APD1 gives values for the thermistor as 5.1kΩ@298K and
34.4kΩ@253K. The optimal choice of resistor in the potential divider is that which
creates the biggest variation in voltage between the quiescent (room temperature)
state and the activated (cooled) state
Substituting in RTh, the thermistor values for each state and varying R1, the





the widest VOUT swing between 25
◦C and -25◦C is found when R1 is near to the
E24 value of 13kΩ. The graph of this is shown in figure 4.10.
1Perkin Elmer C30902S-DTC
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Figure 4.9: The new cooling circuit. The thermistor, RTh is placed in a po-
tential divider circuit with resistor R1 which is monitored by a fast comparator
(AD8564). The comparator was set such that its output was high when the tem-
perature was above the threshold. The comparator output was used to switch a
MOSFET (IRF7201) which supplied power to the peltier cooler. The comparison
voltage was set with a second potential divider with R2 = R1 thus the value of
RV could be set to be the desired value of RTh allowing for simple changing of the
threshold temperature.
To set the temperature to another value, the thermistor equation must be used
[134]:









where R0 is the known resistance at a known temperature, T0, RTh(T ) is the
resistance at temperature T and β is a device specific constant given on the data
sheet supplied as 3200. A graph of equation 4.3 is shown in figure 4.11.
For small changes in desired temperature, with R1 = R2, the comparison and
thermistor potential dividers are the same and so the comparison trimmer (RV from
figure 4.9) can simply be tuned to the value of the desired thermistor resistance
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Figure 4.10: Voltage swing at the comparator input between 25◦C and −20◦C. A
maximum can clearly be seen at close to the nearest preferred value of 13kΩ
calculated from equation 4.3. For a drastic change in the desired temperature, in
order to maintain the widest voltage swing at the input of the comparator, the
value of the fixed resistors R1, R2 should be recalculated, combining equation 4.2
and equation 4.3 the optimal fixed resistor value in kΩ, for the temperature range
















which yields the exact value of R(253K) = 13.253kΩ.
116
CHAPTER 4. THE BOB TERMINAL
4.2. IDEAS
Figure 4.11: Thermistor resistance with temperature for C30902S-DTC APD
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An active circuit (quench and reset) was designed and produced providing the ability
to choose whether either active part is enabled. This allowed for a direct comparison
between Passive and Active behaviour since the other circuit characteristics were
identical.
There are a range of different active quenching schemes, a large design concern
with this application was that the detectors operate at a large overvoltage (25-30V)
to provide good timing performance and efficiency [73,92, 94,97]
The “voltage mode” (see [97]) detection of the circuit is not the best in terms
of timing performance however it was chosen due to the simplicity of the imple-
mentation and the similarity to the current passive implementation. This will allow
for versatility in testing the QKD performance of the techniques and may help to
inform further developments in the quenching scheme to use.
A schematic of the design is shown in figure 4.12. Note that whilst the Active
Reset feature is optional, the reset transistor is required anyway to discharge the
gate of the quench transistor. It is necessary to employ a diode-OR to isolate the
Quench Gate and diode voltage to reset them through the same transistor.
Data was recorded by observing the signal output of the circuit on an oscilloscope
and overlaying the pulses following a trigger pulse onto a single trace, figure 4.13.
Since dark counts are random, a picture will build up of secondary pulses occurring
after the trigger but with no counts within the dead time which can then be measured
directly.
Following the dead time measurement, a measurement of the timing jitter was
made by employing a fast laser (PicoQuant PDL800B) incident on the SPAD. A
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Figure 4.12: Active quenching, active reset circuit. The voltage pulse from a de-
tection is sensed by the comparator which outputs a click synchronous with the
avalanche time. This signal also starts a monostable multivibrator which produces
a pulse of width independent of the comparator pulse. This monostable pulse is
used to trigger a MOSFET which applies a quenching voltage greater than the over-
voltage being applied to the APD. A second monostable triggered on the negative
edge of the first monostable pulse then shorts the load resistor such that the APD
recharges quickly. The gate of the quench MOSFET is also shorted to ensure any
remaining charge is dissipated.
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Figure 4.13: Oscilloscope traces from which the values of dead time for AQC Circuit
with active component disengaged (a) and with active component engaged (b)
.
time correlated single photon counting (TCSPC) measurement was made using a
PicoHarp 300 using the laser sync pulse to start the counter and the AQ Circuit
output to stop the counter. A histogram of 60 seconds of data with a laser rep rate
of 5MHz and a count rate of 1.0 × 105 ± 0.5counts/sec from the AQ circuit. figure
4.14
This measurement was performed for a variety of different count rates (by mod-
ifying the laser intensity) to investigate the effect of count rate on jitter, this data
is displayed in table 4.1. It is suspected that this dependence is a result of the APD
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Figure 4.14: Histogram of time differences between Start and Stop of the TCSPC
measurement to determine the jitter of the AQ circuit.
bias not recharging fully before the next detection, an effect which is more likely to
happen at higher count rates. If the bias has not charged fully then the avalanche
peak height will not be as high and a different point on the rising edge slope will
be detected. Since the voltage mode rises smoothly (figure 4.15), this can lead to a
higher uncertainty in the timing measurement.
Count Rate Timing Jitter (±0.140ns)
5.0± 0.5× 103 1.920
1.0± 0.5× 104 1.992
5.0± 0.5× 104 3.076
1.0± 0.5× 105 5.116
Table 4.1: Timing Jitter of AQ Circuit for varying SPAD illumination intensities
The timing jitter is higher than that of a “current mode” passively quenched
system however it is sufficient for providing a modest increase to the maximum
transmission rate. The absolute maximum timing jitter for a given transmission
rate would be such that the timing jitter could lead to a detection being registered
as from the preceding or succeeding clock period.
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Figure 4.15: The avalanche signal of the active quench circuit. This signal was
taken from the anode of the APD rather than the comparator input for clarity; due
to the nature of the circuit, the comparator input is an attenuated version of this
waveform [97].
4.4 Summary
This chapter has focused on improving the detectors in the system by:
• Investigating Active Quenching of the SPADs.
• Improving the cooling of the SPADs to improve reliability and control.
The SPAD quenching circuit developed is what [97] would refer to as a mixed
Passive-Active quench circuit. It achieved a 79% reduction in the dead time (from
3.30 to 0.68 µS). This circuit was not stable enough for inclusion into the system
however it is a good starting point for further investigation. A simple active hold-
off was attempted by implementing a 4 input OR gate with diodes connecting all
quench signals together however this injected spurious signals back into the SPAD
terminals which triggered the comparators resulting in the circuit output oscillating
by producing repeated quench pulses.
The cooling circuit proved effective and was installed into the final system. The
main advantage of this version was that it runs on a single supply voltage (5V) and
consistently works2.
2there was some issue with the previous cooling circuit where it would occasionally need to be





Since the system discussed in chapter 2 was demonstrated, sufficient changes have
been applied to the system as a whole that it is necessary to re-characterise the
system. There has been a complete overhaul of the field programmable gate array
(FPGA) devices in Alice and Bob [79]; the Alice optics were reconstructed in order
to attempt to improve a weak LED which was providing difficulty in alignment
and the detector cooling was reworked (section 4.2.4) to a simpler method which
should prove more reliable. In addition to the changes, the previous characterisation
(section 2.3.3) was not as rigorous as it could have been due to time constraints and
so a great deal more data was collected for this analysis.
It is unfortunate however that none of the work into the polarizers and LED
collimator (chapter 3) or the active quenching of the detectors (chapter 4) was
mature or reliable enough to integrate into the quantum key distribution (QKD)
system at this time.
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5.1.1 Magnetic Docking
The magnetic docking method was analysed previously (section 2.3.3) and the results
displayed in figure 2.15 prove the repeatability of placement of the magnetic docking
system for the Alice device for a small number of replacements. It does not, however,
compare this against the natural, random fluctuation of the signal over time. This
was rectified and is shown in figure 5.1. The Alice device was placed in the cradle,
aligned and a single LED was set to pulse in order to be able to get extinction via
looking at the counts alone. Channel count rates were taken every 10 seconds for
500 seconds and the extinction ratio (ratio of counts in the intended detector in the
transmission basis vs ratio in the opposite detector in the basis) calculated, then, for
a further 500 seconds, in between every measurement the Alice device was removed
and replaced in the magnetic dock.
Figure 5.1: The signal count rate and QBER in one basis for subsequent placements
of the magnetic mount compared with data taken at the same intervals with the
Alice device fixed. The one anomaly in placement had little effect on the extinction
and did not effect subsequent placements.
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Aside from a notable anomalous point, the replacement count rate remains within
±15% of the mean and 74% of points are within 2.6% of the mean (the maximum
deviation for the data where the Alice device was not repeatedly docked). It is
important to note that the anomalous point in the replacement data does not cor-
respond to an increase in the extinction ratio and the count rate returns to normal
after this, the most likely explanation for this point is that the mount was not cor-
rectly docked since it had no effect on subsequent data points. The magnitude of
the extinction in this experiment is not important to the characterisation since the
experiment was performed with the lights on to allow for easy docking. Characteri-
sation of extinction ratios for each channel separately are found in section 5.1.2 for
ungated data and in section 5.2.2 for gated data.
5.1.2 Extinction Matrices
A method of clearly showing the maximum achievable ratios of signal to noise in
all 4 channels in one chart is to plot a 4x4 bar chart showing count rates on all 4
detectors for each LED individually. The perfect case here would be 50% counts
occurring in the intended channel, 0% in the orthogonal and the remaining split
25% each in the two off-basis detectors.
This was investigated by pulsing each LED individually and collecting count
rates in all 4 detectors corresponding to each LED. This data is shown in figure 5.2.
Obviously background light, dark counts and imperfections in the polarization
(preparation and measurement) will cause some deviation from this situation. A
figure of merit here is the “extinction ratio”, the proportion of the counts in the
correct basis which was detected in the wrong channel. In the case for LED0, from
figure 5.2, it would be:
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where E0 is the extinction ratio of the polarization from LED0 and CA and CB
is the count rate in the detectors A and B.
In order to isolate the optical imperfections (as opposed to the noisy contribu-
tions), the count rates when no transmission was occurring were subtracted from all
the subsequent count rates and extinction ratios calculated again. The limitations
of this method are discussed at the end of section 5.2.2, although it is still useful to
establish the contributions to non-optimal extinction from the optics alone.
(a) Extinction matrix (b) Extinction matrix with dark counts sub-
tracted
Figure 5.2: Ungated extinction matrices of the system with passively quenched de-
tectors. Counts CA−D are shown for detectors Det A-D for each LED0-3 illuminated
individually.






Table 5.1: Numerical extinction ratios with and without the channel dark counts.
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5.2 Gating and Reconciliation
5.2.1 Transmission Isolation
One of the points in the design brief (table 1.1) is that the establishing of a key
should be simple, to this end there is no information regarding the start and stop
times exchanged before the quantum transmission. To achieve this in postprocessing,
the Alice device instructs the Bob device to start collecting data and then starts
transmitting and instructs Bob to stop collecting after the transmission has finished.
Thus there is a range of time tags either side of the transmission window where there
was no signal to detect. The first step of data analysis is to find the start and stop
time tags of the transmission inside Bob’s data.
The transmission boundary finding process is carried out by analysing the in-
tervals between successive time tags, the count rate will obviously increase during
the transmission and as such the gaps between time tags will decrease. Therefore
one can coarsely determine the points at which the transmission starts and stops by
looking for sharp changes in a plot of interval against tag number.
This method of interval analysis works acceptably and to within a few tens of
microseconds however the synchronisation step detailed later in section 5.2.3 is one
of the more time consuming parts of the whole reconciliation process and will, on
average, take longer the more imprecise the coarse start point is determined. As
such a more complicated and time consuming method of identifying the coarse start
point to a high accuracy can actually contribute to a shorter overall processing time.
To improve start point detection, the boundary finding method is changed slightly,
the initial search is done by taking the intervals between every nth tag1 (figure
5.3(a)), smoothing2 (figure 5.3(b)) to make the transition clearer and then noting
1splitting into blocks is used to maintain the speed of the whole technique
2Gaussian weighted moving average is used to preserve the shape of the transition
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where the threshold is crossed. This finds the start and stop points to an accuracy
of approximately ±n time tags and is referred to as the coarse search.
(a) Coarse Intervals (b) Smoothed Coarse Intervals
Figure 5.3: The coarse boundary finding method, note that in the smoothed case
there is a more pronounced transition and less noise “outside” the transmission
Following this step a complete range of tags each side of the coarse start/stop
point is isolated from the tags, smoothed as before and a threshold is applied indi-
vidually3 (figure 5.4). It is possible the coarse technique identified more than one
point at which there was a sharp change in count rate, for now however we are just
interested in accurately finding all of the points determined by the coarse method.
(a) Fine Start (b) Fine Stop
Figure 5.4: The start and stop boundaries approximated from figure 5.3 Note the
comparison between raw intervals (blue) and smoothed (red)
3for especially noisy data, separate thresholds can be applied to start and stop transitions
which are lower and higher respectively
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As mentioned previously it is possible that the coarse process identified more than
one possible transmission window. If this occurred halfway through a transmission it
would lead to an incorrect stop being detected and half the data being discarded with
a consequent reduction in key length. To remedy this Alice declares her transmission
duration and a duration is calculated between each fine start and stop which is
compared to the declared transmission duration window, the two starts and stops
which give a transmission closest to the declared duration is chosen. An example
can be seen in table 5.2 (this example is not connected to the data shown in the rest
of this chapter).
Start Tag Stop Tag Duration ∆T
194950 564475 1.80065 2.19935
565200 868750 2.205479 1.794521
194950 868750 4.006129 0.006129
Table 5.2: An example of the Start/Stop finding process which is insensitive to
anomalous triggering. “Duration” is the time difference between Start and Stop
tags, “∆T” is the (absolute) difference between that duration and the transmission
duration declared by Alice (4 seconds)
5.2.2 Gating
The transmission start and stop times are now determined to within a few microsec-
onds. Using these the transmission can be isolated from the background counts
detected before and after the transmission however there is noise present which oc-
curred during the transmission. To reduce the effect of this noise, the arrival times
of the tags are analysed and compared to their predicted arrival times, any data
outside of the expected arrival time is rejected, this process is referred to as gating
and was briefly mentioned in section 2.2.3.2.
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The time tags generated by the time interval analyser (TIA) are divided modulo
the clock period which can either be found as information shared by Alice or can
be determined by FFT of the time tags. The modulus function returns an integer
number of clock periods (the tag index) and the remainder (position of tag within
clock). The LED pulse width is much less than the clock so a histogram of the
remainders (figure 5.5) should present a narrow peak corresponding to the expected
arrival time of the signal within the clock period and a smaller background level of
randomly distributed noise.
Figure 5.5: Histogram of each time tag in the transmission window divided modulo
the clock period (100ns) showing the overall timing jitter of each channel individually
and for a stream of random data.
The peak is determined and time tags with a remainder further than some value,
the “gate width”, from the peak are discarded. The gate width can be arbitrarily
chosen as some value close to the LED pulse width (pre measured) or determined
from the data by applying successively increasing gates and comparing the propor-
tion of the clock that the gate constitutes against the proportion of the data that
the gated subset constitutes. On a plot of PGated against PGateWidth where:
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where NGated is the number of the total time tags, NTotal which fall within a gate
with width tGate and tClock is the repetition rate of the source.
The point at which the gradient of this graph passes through unity is the point
at which increasing the gate width (and therefore the background, which is uniform
across the clock does not increase the signal by a beneficial proportion. This is
shown graphically in figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: The proportion of the signal which falls within a gate of a given width
(solid line) and the same data differentiated (dotted line) to allow for easier deter-
mination of the point at which widening the gate stops increasing the amount of
signal.
Once the data falling outside of the gate is discarded, the remainders of the
modulo function can be discarded also and the time tag information can be reduced
to a sparse list of integer tag numbers. In a similar manner to figure 5.2, each
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LED can then be pulsed separately and the number of gated tags in each channel
measured and plotted into an extinction matrix. This data can be seen in figure 5.7
with numerical data in table 5.3.
Figure 5.7: Extinction ratios plotted by taking the number of gated time tags (20ns
wide gate) from detections in each detector for individually pulsed LEDs.






Table 5.3: Extinction ratios of data after gating
Comparing table 5.1 with table 5.3 it can be seen that the extinction ratio of
the gated data is better than the ungated when dark counts are included but worse
than the ungated without dark counts. This is because, dependent on the gate
width, some dark counts will naturally fall into the gate and be counted as signal.
The gated data, however, is still a better figure to use since this small contribution
of dark counts to the extinction ratio carries through into the actual raw key and
it is this value of extinction ratio that should be considered when noting the best
attainable QBER.
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5.2.2.1 Clock discrepancy
The Alice and Bob devices have the possibility to share a clock over a coaxial
cable which is useful for testing however this compromises the design philosophy
somewhat and so each device also has an independent oven-controlled crystal os-
cillator (OCXO)4 stable to 200ppb. It is however possible that the two clocks are
not exactly the same frequency, this will cause Alice and Bob’s perception of a time
interval to be different and will result in the data appearing to gradually de-sync.
Figure 5.8: A histogram of the time tags divided modulo the clock period for short
slices of the whole transmission. Shown here is the peak drift between two sub-
sequent slices (solid blue) and the data from both slices analysed in one go (red
dotted), notably the wider slice has a broader peak which would result in requiring
a wider gate and thus increase the amount of background light. Numerals in the
key refer to the slice number in the transmission.
This will lead to a broadening of the gating peak or in extreme cases an inability
to gate the data at all. A solution to this problem is displayed in figure 5.8; the data
is split into short “slices” and each is analysed separately. Shown in the figure is a
0.2 second slice (dotted red) and the same slice split in half with the halves analysed
separately (solid blue). As one might expect the 0.2 second slice histogram is the
sum of the first two 0.1 second slice histograms, thus the peak is broader.
4Micro Crystal HCMOS OCXO
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For now, the solution is to simply slice the data into sufficiently small slices
(100ms) such that each slice can be gated separately and then recombining the
slices once gated. A more in depth method which automatically calibrates the tags
is described in section 5.3.1.
5.2.3 Synchronisation
It is highly unlikely that the first gated tag corresponds to the first quantum bit
(qubit) sent; in order to synchronise the tags to the transmitted data, a small
proportion of the sent data5 is declared (which is then considered public knowledge
and cannot be used in the final key), for now, 10%. Each value of the received data
is compared to its corresponding value in the list of sent data and the proportion
of matches is produced. If the data is unsynchronised 25% of the values will match
by chance. All of the indices of the sent data are then offset and the process is
performed again.
For the correct offset value the match proportion will jump to 50% and the re-
ceived data is permanently reindexed with these offset values. A better, but more
computationally intensive search analyses only those events where the transmis-
sion/measurement bases match and provides a match rate of 50% when the wrong
offset is chosen and approaching 100% when the correct offset is used6. This method
provides an estimate of the QBER of the full transmission by reading off the dis-
crepancy of the peak height from 100%. This technique can be shown in figure 5.9
where the QBER is: (1− 0.9737)× 100 = 2.63%. Once the correct offset has been
found the data is permanently reindexed with the offset values and this constitutes
the raw (sifted) key.
5the finite key formula in section 1.6.2 should be analysed to determine the proportion which
provides the best bound to the QBER without using up too much of the potential key material.
6the most efficient situation here is to perform the basis insensitive search until a candidate
for the best offset is found and then to analyse that offset with the basis sensitive search.
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It was found that the all of the synchronising offset values were near to 0, with
most lying within ±1000 and none lying further than 10000 (corresponding to a
transmission finding accuracy of better than 1ms). To this end the offsets were
increased outwards from zero7 and the process was abandoned when the offset ex-
ceeded 10000.
Figure 5.9: The result of searching for the correct offset between the Alice and Bob
data using the subset of the data where the transmission and detection bases match.
50% of the data matches by chance however when the synchronising offset is found
the match rate increases to nearly 100%. The distance of the peak height from 100%
gives an estimate of the QBER. The maximum offset that should be checked before
abandoning the search is determined by the efficacy of the transmission finding
algorithm (section 5.2.1). It was found that no offset exceeded 10,000 (corresponding
to 1ms).
Now that sifted keys can be generated and the errors between them estimated,
this is an appropriate time to test the gate width optimization performed in section
5.2.2. Recall that the optimal gate width was determined by finding the point
at which widening the gate width by a small proportion produced an increase in
tags within the gate of less than that proportion. This method can be checked by
performing the synchronisation and error estimation steps repeatedly on the same
7i.e. 0, 1, -1, 2, -2
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data with different gate widths. As can be seen in figure 5.10 the point at which
the rate of increase of tags within a widening gate (dotted line) crosses one is also
the point at which there is a sharp change in the QBER.
Figure 5.10: The estimated QBER (solid line) as the gate width is changed compared
to the method using the proportion of the tags inside the gate (dotted line). The
point at which the proportions gradient crosses one signifies when widening the gate
by a proportion does not increase the tags inside the gate by a that proportion, note
that this point coincides with the sharp increase in QBER
If the gating was required to be performed in slices, it is possible that the clock
drift over the whole transmission is longer than the clock period. If this is the case
the offset will not be constant for all of the data and each slice should be synchronised
separately. This is not as bad as one might think as chances are that the offset will
only be ±1 away from the previous block, assuming this, rather than using 0 as the
first guess for the slice offset, the best value for the previous slice can be used. The
data for a sliced analysis is displayed in table 5.4. Once the synchronising offset
has been found for each slice, each can be applied to the relevant data and then the
whole set of slices combined into one synchronised raw key.
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Slice Gate Middle (ns) Best Offset QBER (%)
0 4.5 -493 5.85
1 18.5 -493 6.51
2 37.5 -493 7.10
3 41.5 -493 8.34
4 57.5 -493 4.67
5 72.5 -493 7.42
6 80.5 -493 6.33
7 95.5 -493 7.22
8 10.5 -492 5.30
9 27.5 -492 5.58
10 33.5 -492 5.01
11 49.5 -492 6.13
12 64.5 -492 5.80
13 72.5 -492 6.36
14 87.5 -492 5.35
15 4.5 -491 5.45
16 18.5 -491 3.66
17 27.5 -491 5.56
18 41.5 -491 5.64
19 55.5 -491 5.85
20 64.5 -491 5.70
21 80.5 -491 6.88
22 95.5 -491 3.91
23 14.5 -490 7.26
24 18.5 -490 6.65
25 33.5 -490 6.96
26 49.5 -490 5.83
27 57.5 -490 6.58
28 72.5 -490 6.66
29 87.5 -490 5.34
30 95.5 -490 5.33
31 14.5 -489 4.99
32 27.5 -489 5.02
33 41.5 -489 5.79
34 49.5 -489 6.96
35 64.5 -489 5.19
36 81.5 -489 6.48
37 87.5 -489 6.16
38 3.5 -488 6.79
39 18.5 -488 5.42
Average 5.98
Table 5.4: The gate position, sync offset and QBER for each 0.1 second slice of a
4 second transmission. (This is the same data as was used in the example in figure
5.8). Note the gradual increase of the gate middle within the clock period until it
reaches the value of the clock period and rolls over, incrementing the data offset
value.
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5.2.4 Error Correction
Note that currently the raw key still contains errors, values in Alice and Bob’s
strings which do not match. While this process is generally referred to as Error
Correction [135, 136], the process used here merely identifies the positions of these
errors and removes them. The challenge in this is to ascertain the mismatched bits
without leaking substantial information about the secret bits which do match. The
method used here is detailed in [19], the choice of this method here should not be
considered a suggestion to its appropriateness in the use model of this project, in
fact, the number of separate public communications involved in this method would
probably rule it out since the various computational steps would repeatedly find
themselves held up by the latency of the public channel.
The process of identifying the errors consists of Alice and Bob both permuting
their strings by the same random order, dividing these strings into blocks of length
b and comparing the parities of these blocks8. If the parities match the blocks are
either the same or contain an even number of errors (this issue is addressed later),
if the parities do not match, the block is divided in two and the parity of one
half is compared. If the parities do not match in this block then the sub block is
further divided until the error position is isolated, in the case that the parities of
the compared sub block match then the error is necessarily in the other block and
the second block can be divided without the parity comparison (which leaks data)
needing to be carried out.
A point briefly touched upon in the previous paragraph is that of leaking data,
that comparing the parities reveals a small amount of information to an Eavesdrop-
per who must be assumed has some information about the key already from the
presence of errors. This is mitigated here by Alice and Bob each discarding one ele-
ment of any compared block (or sub block). This is where the usefulness of inferring
8the sum of all elements modulo 2
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a sub block contains errors by virtue of the fact that the other half of the block does
not, it reduces the number of comparisons and therefore the number of bits that
need to be discarded.
Once the whole sifted key has been compared, Alice and Bob perform a further
identical permutation of their data and perform the steps again albeit with a larger
block size since the chance of finding two errors in a block of size b has decreased
(some errors were removed in the previous step). Randomly permuting the data
again should reveal further errors which were previously residing in blocks with an
even number of errors. This process of permuting and repeating the algorithm is
carried out until the whole string is passed through twice without identifying any
errors.
Figure 5.11: The proportion of bits discarded during error correction for a range of
block sizes. Each QBER was simulated 5 times, this makes the step-like transition
where sometimes the error correction completes in n passes for a given QBER, some-
times n + 1. The code efficiency is plotted alongside the Shannon limit, (equation
5.4, the theoretical best performance of an error correcting code.
Figure 5.11 shows the performance of this algorithm for various starting block
sizes and compares this to the theoretical lower bound for leakage defined by the
Shannon limit at that QBER, H2(e) where:
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H2 (x) = −x log2 (x)− (1− x) log2 (1− x) (5.4)
It can be seen that the algorithm performance tracks the Shannon limit within
20% if the initial block size is chosen correctly.
5.3 Daylight Operation
For further characterisation, data was collected and analysed by the processes above
for varying levels of background illumination (provided by a CW red LED powered
through a variable resistor) and a plot of QBER against background was obtained
(figure 5.12). In the same manner as table 2.1, the system parameters for these




Mean Photon Number 0.1
Transmission Time 4 seconds
Gate Width 5ns
Table 5.5: The experimental parameters.
For this process the background was estimated by taking note the number of time
tags which did not fall into the gate during the gating process. This is acceptable
for laboratory characterisation with a fixed gate width as the relationship between
number of ungated tags and brightness (measured by a power meter adjacent to
the input lens of the Bob optics) is linear however this is susceptible to attack in a
manner similar to the attack described in [49]. The reason the power meter level was
not used as an estimate of background is that the power meter has a wider spectral
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Figure 5.12: The rising QBER with rising background. The blue points signify the
data collected by variable LED illumination. The red points are those with more
broadband background sources - “desk lamp” being a small desk lamp switched on
in an otherwise dark lab, “lab light” being the main lab strip lights switched on.
response than the Bob device which would cause it to overestimate a broadband
background compared to a spectrally narrower background. A possible approach to
rectify this is to place a photodiode (not a single photon avalanche diode (SPAD))
after the optical filter in the Bob device, taking a small fraction of the light from
the optical path with an unbalanced beam splitter for example.
In order to test long-term reliability, the system was also run continuously for
23 hours between 13:00 on 4th June 2013 to 12:00 on 5th June 2013. The system is
not intended for constant usage but the process of repeatedly exchanging key shows
the repeatability of the system. Figure 5.13(a) shows the estimated QBER for each
measurement taken overnight (in seconds since the start of the measurement) and
clearly shows a drop in QBER overnight when the background was lower. The sunset
time on 04/06/13 was 21:22, the sharp change at 25000sec corresponds to a time of
approximately 20:00 which was probably the point at which the sun dropped below
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the visible horizon, obscured by trees or buildings.
Figure 5.13(b) plots the same data as figure 5.13(a) but shows the background
rate against the QBER, this shows that natural fluctuations in the broadband back-
ground light cause the same effect as those in figure 5.12. Note however that the
values for background between figures 5.13(b) and 5.12 are not necessarily compa-
rable, this is because the method for estimating the background is not an absolute
method and relies on analysing the ungated tags which depends on the gate width.
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(a) The QBER at various times through a measurement (in kSeconds)
between 13:00 on 04/06/13 and 12:00 on 05/06/13. Note the reduction
of QBERcorresponding with night-time. The small proportion of higher
error data points can be ascribed to the TIA error mentioned at the end of
section 5.3.
(b) A graph of the QBER against the estimated background for each data
point from figure 5.13(a). The linear trend conforms to the laboratory testing
displayed in figure 5.12
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A small proportion (< 10%) of the measurements are erroneously high, this
appears to be a fault in the time to digital converter (TDC) on the TIA. This was
discovered by noticing the gating histogram (figure 5.5) had developed a secondary
peak in the high error measurements. Separating the data into 300ms slices and
synchronising each individually revealed that there was a gap of several milliseconds
in the timing data. Upon checking the Alice electronics and TIA, the TIA was
determined to be the source of the error suggesting the timing counter was just not
counting over a certain range of numbers properly.
An example of this erroneous behaviour is shown in figure 5.13, each of the slices
shown in the figure were synchronised separately (table 5.6) and a drastic jump in
the synchronising offset was seen to occur from close to zero to ≈ −40000 clock
periods corresponding to a discontinuity of the order milliseconds.
The discovery of this behaviour also highlights the fact that this QKD system is
providing a beta testing of the TIA device being designed at Bristol. In the current
version of the TIA this fault has been rectified.
Slice Gate Middle Best Offset QBER (%)
1 10.5ns 38 1.76
2 10.5ns 38 2.51
3 35.5ns -40087 5.36
4 35.5ns -40087 4.34
5 35.5ns -40087 2.05
6 35.5ns -40087 1.30
7 35.5ns -40087 3.35
Average 2.96%
Table 5.6: The first 7 slices of a glitched data set showing how the offset drastically
changes and at this point the gate centre moves as the discontinuity is not an integer
number of clock periods. The QBER for the non-sliced analysis (using the first 10%
of the transmission to sync) for this data set was 11%.
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Figure 5.13: A histogram of the remainders of the time tags divided modulo the
clock period of the first 2.1 seconds of a transmission separated into 300ms slices.
The third slice shows two peaks as the discontinuity occurred within this period,
the peak moves as the discontinuity is not necessarily an integer number of clock
periods.
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5.3.1 New TIA
After finding the fault in the TIA, the opportunity was taken to upgrade to the
newest working version of the Bristol-developed TIA (Figure 5.14) which has inde-
pendent timing circuitry on each input. This allows for more accurate measurements
however it introduces an issue in that there may be delays in the different channels
which could move the relative positions of the gating histogram for each channel.
To this end the time tags were analysed individually to find a range of calibration
factors which were then applied to the tags before the analysis described in section
5.2.
Figure 5.14: The new TIA device developed at Bristol. The timing accuracy is
improved by about 25% over the previous device. It also now interfaces over USB
rather than ethernet and timing bin width calibration is performed onboard.
First the time tags are split according to their channel of arrival, some small time
window of tags are taken9 and divided modulo the clock period (figure 5.15). The
data in figure 5.15 shows that channels A&C and channels B&D are synchronised
to each other but there is some difference between these pairs.
Due to the unsycnchronised clocks, the histograms are quite noisy and therefore
some way of determining the middle of the peaks is required. Fitting a gaussian
to the data appears to be a promising idea however if the peak were close to 0 or
9in order to reduce the effects of the unsynchronised clocks
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Figure 5.15: Histogram of tags divided modulo clock period from the first 100ms
slice of a transmission. Differing delays in the pulse discrimination circuit and the
TDC cause the peaks to appear in different places. This confuses gating and is
detrimental to QKD performance.
the clock period then the fitting algorithm may produce odd results due to the data
“wrapping around” to the other side of the graph. Thus, in order to fit a gaussian, a
rough estimate of the middle of the peak needs to be made so the data can be offset
such that it is close to the middle. This is performed by assuming that the largest
bin in the data set roughly corresponds to the middle and adding this value to all of
the time tags in the channel and will be known as the rough correction. This process
is shown in figure 5.16 and the gaussian fits are shown in figure 5.17. The gaussian
fits now are also not exactly in the middle however the peak fitting algorithm returns
the value of the peak middle, this value is known as the fine correction.
Adding the fine correction to every tag will then bring all of the channels into
synchronisation which can be verified by applying the corrections to some other
temporal slice of tags in the transmission figure 5.18.
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Figure 5.16: An initial estimate of the centre of each of the channel peaks is made
by assuming the centre is close to the maximum bin. A constant time is added to
every time tag with that channel to move this estimated maximum to the middle of
the clock period.
Figure 5.17: A gaussian is fitted to the peak (hence why it is moved to the middle
of the clock first - if it were near the end the fitting could malfunction). A further
correction is applied to move the gaussian centres to the middle of the clock.
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Figure 5.18: Histogram of tags divided modulo clock period once the channel syn-
chronising offsets have been applied. This slice is taken between 3500ms-3600ms
showing that the channel synchronisation does not change over the course of the
transmission.
Since we are developing calibration techniques, this was used as an opportunity
to apply a correction to all of the tags to account for the clock discrepancies. This
process also relies on fitting gaussians to histograms of the tags divided modulo
clock period, in this case knowing the original peak centre is required so after the
data is offset by the rough centre position and the gaussian is fitted, the rough
position value is then subtracted from the gaussian to get the original peak centre.
As can be seen from a graph of histograms of subsequent 100ms slices of the tags
divided modulo clock period, the peak position moves in a constant direction (figure
5.19). This is due to the clocks having a slightly different clock period, the peaks not
being exactly the same distance apart is due to random fluctuations in the period
and as such we will analyse every slice and obtain the average discrepancy for the
transmission.
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Figure 5.19: The Alice and Bob clocks are not synchronised (what Alice perceives
to be 100ns and what Bob percieves to be 100ns are different), the histogram of
remainders divided modulo clock period will be broadened and the peak will move
when subsequent temporal slices of the tags are analysed.
For the data in figure 5.19, the average drift was found to be 131.93ns/sec. To
correct this drift, every tag was taken and was transformed by:
NewTag = Tag + (Tag×Drift) (5.5)
To verify the correction, figure 5.20 shows the same slices as figure 5.19 after the
correction has been applied. The entire transmission plotted in the same histogram
can be seen in figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.20: The slices from figure 5.19 corrected by determining a drift correction
factor from the differences between the peaks of the slice histograms.
Figure 5.21: Histogram of entire transmission time tags divided modulo clock period
(figure 5.20 is only the first 5 slices). Note that the width of the whole transmission
corrected is narrower than that of an individual slice in figure 5.19.
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With the new TIA and new calibration technique, the experiment from section
5.3 was performed again, from 15:30 on 12/11/13 to 11:00 on 13/11/13. The drop
in error rate in figure 5.22 corresponds to a time around 17:30 (office lights being
switched off) and the gradual increase corresponds to sunrise (07:26 - 57360 seconds
from experiment start). Again the data was also plotted against the background
light levels (estimated by the number of ungated tags) (figure 5.23) and was seen
to be linear. There were no erroneously high data points in this data set showing
that the system is suitable for long-term operation and the new TIA has solved the
reliability issues.
Figure 5.22: The error rate of the QKD transmission as a function of time for 19.5
hours from 15:30 12/11/13 to 11:00 13:11:13. Sharp drop around 17:30 corresponding
to the office being vacated (artificial lighting switched off) and a gradual increase
from sunrise (07:26 - 57360 seconds since experiment start).
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Figure 5.23: The linear relationship between error rate and background light level
(estimated by number of ungated tags received).
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5.4 Summary
This section has re-characterised the Bristol Low Cost Short Range QKD system
and developed a modular, general purpose software suite for data analysis. This
software consists of:
• Transmission isolation.
• Software clock synchronisation.
• Gating (including optimal gate width determination).
• Reconciliation.
• Error correction.
The system, however, is by no means complete, what has been achieved is a
proof-of-principle “Quantum ATM” with a removable handheld Alice device. There
is much to modify in the system to bring it to state of the art.
Finite Key Section 1.6.2 introduced the concept that security is not guaranteed
for a certain range of parameters unless those parameters are estimated to a
sufficient accuracy. This means that a certain number of signals need to be
exchanged before any key can be generated at all. [137] rigorously simulated
this system and concluded that the transmission time to exchange sufficient
signals to generate key is unacceptably long (O(100)) seconds with realistic
background light levels).
Rate Improvements The smaller LEDs from chapter 3 and the actively quenched
SPADs from chapter 4 are being designed in part to increase the possible
transmission rate for the system, in the finite key regime this will reduce the
time until secure key is generated back down to a practical level for a consumer
system.
154
CHAPTER 5. KEY EXCHANGE
5.4. SUMMARY
Protocol Change Decoy states can also provide a benefit to the key rate. It would
be a trivial modification to the Alice electronics to have two driver circuits with
different current limits per LED (to give the option between two different µ
values) although it would add extra size. Currently the Alice LED drivers are
made from discrete components but designing an integrated chip could bring
this method into feasibility. Note that this method also requires 50% more
random bits than regular Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84).
Implementation Security This is not really a modification per se however it
should always be noted that any change to the system should be considered
in its resistance (or otherwise) to implementation and side channel attacks.
Currently the largest issue here is that a passively quenched SPAD circuit is
highly susceptible to being controlled by tuned laser pulses.
Integrate Random Bit Generation In parallel to this project, a shot noise based
random bit generator is being developed. It is not yet possible to incorporate
this into the system but is forthcoming.
Privacy Amplification Once error correction is performed, some form of classical
privacy amplification is required. This reduces any information Eve might still
have on the key to zero and is the final step in obtaining a genuinely secret
key.
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In chapter 1 a background in classical cryptography was established before describing
the necessity for quantum key distribution (QKD). Various QKD protocols are
introduced and the Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol was chosen as the most
appropriate for this system. Thus a deeper analysis of the security of BB84 and
various modifications to the protocol were discussed.
Chapter 1 then provided a brief history of free space QKD, specifically discussing
the introduction of the various design choices which have been utilized in this sys-
tem. Notably the techniques of beam combining for qubit generation rather than
modulating a single source and the utilization of a 50:50 beam splitter in the detec-
tion optics in order to perform the random basis choice. Following this discussion,
several applications for our low cost, short range system are suggested.
Chapter 2 covered the system in general, giving an idea of the components
utilized and the principles governing its operation. The chapter then went on to
discuss the preparations made for the SECOQC conference wherein a range of dif-




date was presented. An average extinction ratio was measured at 6.87% and a
≈ 40, 000counts/second secret key rate (determined by the GLLP proof) was mea-
sured in indoor lighting conditions. Following this work, the finite key security proofs
detailed in section 1.6 yielded a very long key expansion time, clearly insufficient for
consumer applications.
In light of the finite key result from chapter 2, it was deemed necessary to
increase the transmission rate. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 separated this task into
improvements to the Alice and Bob devices (respectively). Work was carried out
to fulfill the requirements described in table 1.1 by isolating subcomponents of the
devices and carrying out research into methods of improving them especially in light
of the performance measured in chapter 2.
Chapter 3 concentrated on miniaturizing the optics of quantum bit (qubit) gen-
eration for reasons of practicality and speed of operation. A new method for colli-
mating several sources into one by pinhole diffraction was suggested and simulated.
Dimensions of less than 500µm × 500µm and 10-15mm length were seen as viable
for the current state of the art technologies. Based on this collimation technique,
a new method for producing the polarization states necessary for BB84 using mi-
crostructured gratings was introduced and tested. Whilst a polarizing effect was
detected, the maximum extinction ratio was less than 7:1 which is not yet sufficient
for application into the system but shows promise for the technique.
Chapter 4 concerned the efficiency and speed of the detection optics whilst in-
creasing security. The dead time of the detectors was brought closer to the state of
the art (from 3.3µs to 680ns) at the expense of timing jitter. A modification to Ac-
tive Quenching was proposed, simulated and analysed which quenches all detectors
when any one detector clicks. This method was shown in simulation to not saturate
in the same manner as a passive circuit where detections during another detector’s




however the circuit was not stable enough for integration into the system.
An improved cooling circuit was also designed which replaced the microcontroller
based circuit used previously with one based on a comparator. This circuit is simpler
to set up, more efficient and more reliable.
Chapter 5 details the actual process of generating key from the components
described previously. Characterisation previously carried out in chapter 2 was car-
ried out again, most importantly the reliability of the magnetic docking mount for
providing quick alignment was thoroughly tested.
A complete Python program was written to collect and analyse data to generate
raw key and a basic error correction algorithm was implemented. Appendix A
discusses the code structure and its performance.
A method of synchronising independent clocks by analysing the data received
in temporal slices was implemented and shown to work in situations where a non
sliced analysis would fail. This method also unveiled some erroneous behaviour in
the time interval analyser (TIA) hardware which has since been rectified.
The error correction algorithm implemented is based on the highly interactive
CASCADE algorithm. The interactivity requires many small communications be-
tween Alice and Bob, while this does not strain the connection bandwidth, the
latency of the link can cause significant issues in a commercial application. Nev-
ertheless, with correct selection of the initial block size, this algorithm performed
with efficiency close to the Shannon limit - the theoretical limit for the efficiency of
an error correction protocol.
In light of the finite key security analysis, discussing the secret key rate is not
strictly possible with this system currently, the operation rate is far too low to
exchange sufficient signals in a reasonable amount of time to generate secure key.
Nevertheless, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is still an important metric in
the analysis of a QKD system and this was analysed for a variety of background
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illumination rates in the lab and for an extended period of time in a naturally light
room.
The QBER over a 23 hour experiment were found to track the expected back-
ground illumination (correlated with the time of day), approximately 5% during the
day time, 4% in the evening and 3% at night.
6.2 Suggested Future Improvements
6.2.1 Alice
A polarization effect was measured from microstructured 1D gratings although the
effect observed here was not sufficient for application into the QKD setup. Consid-
ered as a major limitation is that of the focussed ion beam (FIB) processing being
unable to etch high aspect ratio features (deep and narrow trenches in this case)
accurately and the relatively small area that can be patterned at once. This is not
an insurmountable problem as FIB etching was chosen due to its speed and sim-
plicity for prototyping and another technique such as e-beam lithography could be
employed for better accuracy and eventually larger volume production.
The current LEDs are of large size which restricts the investigation of beam
combiners such as those described in section 3.1.2. A micro LED array1 would be a
perfect test bed for further application as not only are the pitches small enough to
apply the pinhole collimation techniques, the active areas are also small enough such
that microfabricating polarizers across the entire surface is possible which removes
the requirement for any extra focusing optics. The reduced area will hopefully lead
to a lower parasitic capacitance which would allow for higher pulse rates although
this is not yet a concern since the rate is currently limited by the detector dead
time.
1http://www.mled-ltd.com/ or http://www.tyndall.ie/content/leds-gan for example
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Due to the commercial interest in micro LEDs, the currently available modules
tend to be much larger than the 2× 2 necessarily required for a QKD source (figure
6.1. This can be used positively since if the polarizers were tiled as in figure 6.2, then
a small fine tuning of the alignment could be performed by testing the extinction
ratios and count rates of a variety of 2× 2 sub blocks in the array.
Figure 6.1: An example micro LED matrix, during fabrication, each LED in a matrix
like this could have a polarizer fabricated onto it such that there is a tiled grid of
QKD emitters. Image taken from http://www.mled-ltd.com/
Extension work eventually will also need to be carried out on further miniaturiz-
ing the drive and communication electronics in the Alice device however this is not
of paramount importance since it is anticipated that the specifics of the electronics
would be closely related to the final application (eg credit card, mobile phone) and
therefore cannot necessarily be pre-empted.
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Figure 6.2: Example order of tiled polarizers allowing for fine tuning of by selecting
the block with the best alignment. As shown by the coloured boxes, any 2× 2 block
will provide the 4 states required for BB84.
6.2.2 Bob
The ≈ 500ns dead time achieved in section 4.2.1 appears to approach the limit
of what is available when remotely operating the single photon avalanche diodes
(SPADs) using TTL components to process the signals to the quenching drivers2.
Great success has been had by others with emitter-coupled logic (ECL) Logic how-
ever it is a technology that is largely deprecated now so investigation into other
methods is necessary. Attractive technologies to pursue are complex programmable
logic device (CPLD) or field programmable gate array (FPGA), both have com-
petitive bandwidth and would allow for soft reconfiguration, a feature which would
prove useful in commercial application.
The previous system [73] and all work in this thesis have utilized the C30902S-
DTC avalanche photodiodes (APDs) purchased from Perkin Elmer, a performance
gain may be obtained switching to a newer device; [138] suggests the Laser Com-
ponents SAP5003 as an ideal upgrade to the C30902S-DTC citing improved per-
formance in detection efficiency (especially at 600-800nm), timing jitter, minimum
achievable dead time, dark count rate and afterpulsing probability.
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An option to increase the timing performance of the quenching circuit would
be to modify the quench circuit slightly by moving the comparator which senses
the avalanche signal onto the high side of the APD through a capacitor to shield
the comparator from the high voltage DC bias (figure 6.3) [139, 140]. This would
allow the quench voltage to be applied directly to the low side of the APD without
the injecting spurious signal into the comparator (which, if unmanaged, could cause
astable behaviour).
Figure 6.3: A current mode active quenching circuit with sensing performed by a
capacitor on the high side of the APD. The quench is applied on the other side.
This arrangement retains the simplicity of the voltage mode AQAR circuit but has
much better timing performance. Image is fig 12 in [139].
Depending on the final decision on the exit pinhole of the Alice optics, a SPAD
with a smaller active area than the C30902S-DTC (500µm) could be employed,
this would increase performance by reducing junction capacitance (a contributor
to the dead time and jitter) and there are some devices such as the id101 from
idquantique4 which have all control electronics packaged with the detector. It must
be noted however that a 50µm active area would either cause high loss (due to the
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6.2.3 Processing
Currently, to aid prototyping and development speed, the current processing code is
written in Python with some targeted bottlenecks written in Cython5. The Numpy
and Scipy libraries have provided a useful base however a migration to a faster
language will be required for actual application. In fact, all processing has been
demonstrated on an FPGA [141] although this solution is probably somewhat pre-
mature for this system, it is intriguing to imagine integrating the TIA and processing
on the same FPGA.
To allow for independent development, the software for Alice, the TIA and the
Bob processing have been developed separately, this has allowed performance anal-
ysis and bug fixing to be isolated but has meant that integrating all of these into
one system has presented issues. For example, the TIA collects the time tags into
RAM, saves to a file and then the analysis program then must load the tags from
the file back into RAM. This is a totally unnecessary process and leads to a large
delay in processing.
Another intriguing possibility regarding the software, is to involve parallel pro-
cessing techniques where appropriate. An example where this technique would pro-
vide significant gains is in the synchronising step, each offset analysed is independent
of the previous offsets analysed, a situation referred to as “embarrassingly parallel”.
This could be done either on a multi-core processor or on a general purpose graphical
processing unit (GPGPU).
6.2.4 General System
Along with specific modifications to components of the system, there are also more
generalised improvements which would improve the project overall. While the mag-
netic mount is currently sufficient for maintaining alignment, if a system were to be
5a compiled Python-like language which can provide performance improvements
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implemented it is possible several different devices of differing specifications could be
used at the same time, the best (hardware) solution to this is implementing an auto
alignment system wherein a set pattern is transmitted by the Alice device and the
Bob terminal measures the detections and maximises the count rate and extinction
ratios by adjusting the relative xyz position, tip/tilt and rotation of the Alice and
Bob optics.
With a view to being able to demonstrate this device to an audience, progress is
necessary in some non scientific aspects of the project as well. Namely a clear and
simple interface for interacting with the system and generating keys, preferably also
including some kind of demonstration of encryption with exchanged keys as “proof”
of the principle. Further to this, a modification of the Bob device to identify distinct
Alice devices with a “handshake” and then store independent key pairs between
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Nature Photonics, 3:687–695, 2009.
[81] P Michler, A Kiraz, C Becher, W Schoenfeld, P Petroff, L Zhang, E Hu,
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The QKD processing task was split into sections corresponding to its basic func-
tionality and each was timed separately. The sections are as follows:
Bob IO Since the program is currently standalone, it loads a file consisting of
[CHANNEL] [COUNTER] and [PHASE], where [CHANNEL] is the time in-
terval analyser (TIA) channel that triggered (1, 2, 4, 8 for singles, any sum
of these for coincidences) and [COUNTER] and [PHASE] are the coarse clock
and delay tap which form the time tag. These are processed into time tags
by multiplying the [COUNTER] value by the clock rate and looking up the
appropriate [PHASE] value from an automatically (by the TIA) generated
calibration histogram.
Tag Sorting The tags are then checked for integrity and anomalies rejected. Pos-
sible anomalies include: zero channel, non sequential tags, abnormally large
tags. This is also the section which deals with randomly assigning the coinci-
dence counts to one of their constituent channels.
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A.1. INITIAL CODE
Coarse/Fine Boundary Finding These are discussed in detail in section 5.2.1.
In brief the intervals between adjacent tags are analysed, a decrease in the
average interval signifies the transmission window. The coarse pass concerns
itself with every nth tag for speed, the fine pass focuses on the points flagged
by the coarse search and finds more exact values.
Gating Time The data is divided modulo the transmission clock and the remain-
ders are plotted on a histogram. All remainders outside of a window (the gate)
of the maximum of the histogram are considered background. The integer part
of the modulo division is then considered as the tag number and the timing
data is thrown away.
Alice IO The subset of the transmitted data required for synchronisation and error
estimation is loaded.
Sync Finding The transmitted string is compared to the gated tags for offsets
spreading from zero until a greater than 85% match is found. If this step fails
all the channels can be mapped to a different permutation in case Alice and
Bob’s channel names do not correspond to each other.
Key assembly The offset determined in the sync set is applied to one of the data
sets. For the sake of characterisation, the error rate of the full data set is also
obtained here (obviously this would not occur for actual key generation).]
Error Correction The error correction algorithm described in section 5.2.4 is per-
formed. Again, the error rate of the full data set can be calculated here for
characterisation.
Some sample key exchange timings are displayed in table A.1.
184












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX A. QKD PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
A.2. NUMPY OPTIMIZATIONS
Some trends apparent in this data:
• Most of the times increase for increasing background. This is not surprising
since a set duration is measured and since the signal is roughly constant, more
background = more tags.
• While the coarse boundary finding is dependent on background, the fine bound-
ary finding isn’t. This is because the coarse method has to process all of the
tags however the fine method only processes the output of the coarse method
which is always the same.
• Sync time is unrelated to background. This is surprising since one would
expect that the higher background might obscure the exact start point of the
transmission. Obviously the sync time and the offset are directly related.
A.2 Numpy optimizations
Between initial submission of this work an examination, the entire code was rewritten
using Numpy, a suite of optimized numerical functions for Python written in C. As
can be seen in table A.2, this has had a varying degree of success depending on
the task. This is because some of the required functions perform exactly the task
required (eg. for smoothing the intervals there exists a convolution function which
performs this efficiently).
In order to accommodate the functions, the order of processing was changed
slightly so a description of the steps is below:
Data loading Python was found to not be fast enough to aquire the data from
the TIA thus an external library needs to be wrapped to integrate into the
program. For now the data files are loaded from disk.
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Tag Processing The 4 independent TIA channels do not guarantee that the tags
are in chronological order in the list, thus the sorting described previously is
still necessary. This step can also filter tags out based on their channel (if
required for testing).
Isolate Transmission Same as the boundary finding above. [Slice, Filter] Tags
falling within one detector dead time of the previous tag are removed (for
security), the time tags in the transmission are shifted such that the first tag
is zero (which makes synchronizing the data easier since the indices will start
near 0) and the data is split into slices of a set duration
Correct Clock Drift The process described in section 5.3.1 is performed, correct-
ing the drifts due to unsynchronised clocks in the Alice and Bob devices and
differences in the TIA channels.
Find Data Sync Offset Same as above, even though the drift is corrected, the
analysis is still performed in slices which allows for the first slice synchronising
offset to be used as an initial guess for the next slice. This is usually the correct
guess so the remaining slice offsets can be determined without searching a
large range. As in table A.1, the Synchronising offset is shown in brackets
beneath this number. The sync finding time is linearly proportional to the
synchronising offset.
Total Time To give an impression of the processing time, the total running time
is displayed along with the processing time, ie, without the data loading.
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APPENDIX A. QKD PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
A.2. NUMPY OPTIMIZATIONS
Some observations:
• The tags take longer to load because the new TIA outputs the tags as floats
rather than the “Counter” and “Phase” integers which need processing, these
floats are then loaded into a Numpy array which takes longer but the array
can be processed much more efficiently.
• The processing is also longer as the independent TIA channels produce more
non-sequential time tags (theoretically, the previous one should not have pro-
duced any).
• The numpy.diff() and numpy.convolve() functions almost entirely perform the
boundary finding process and as such a 20× speed increase is observed.
• A contributor to the sync time being shorter is the use of Numpy arrays
however there does not exist a standard function for this process so the speed
up is not as marked as for the transmission finding. This only contributes to
roughly halving the processing time per offset, the other increase is that the
transmission finding algorithm being so much faster allows a higher resolution
search which can determine the transitions more accurately (and as such their
indices will be closer to zero).
• Error correction was not performed on these data sets as the algorithm has
not changed at all.
• The data loading now accounts for nearly half of the processing time.
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